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International securities markets will soon exceed the ability of any individual
domestic authority to regulate them, and be accessible only to true international
regulatory standards. The increase in international securities trading may be
demonstrated in a few figures: in 1983, new international equity offerings
amounted to only $200 million;' by comparison, new equity issues on the domes-
tic U.S. market in that year totalled over $52 billion. 2 However, by 1986 equity
offerings on the international market expanded to $11.8 billion, compared to
$66.2 billion in domestic U.S. equity issues;3 in September 1987 alone, new
international equity offerings totalled $6.6 billion. 4 Both the Securities and Ex-
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1. See STAFF OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE SENATE
COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS AND THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON EN-
ERGY AND COMMERCE ON THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS 11-53 (1987)
[hereinafter SEC STAFF REPORT]. Part of the information in this article concerning the activities of
the Commission and its staff was obtained from this SEC Staff Report.
2. Id. at 11-105.
3. Id. at 11-53.
4. DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK REPORT 11-20 (1988) [hereinafter MARKET BREAK REPORTI.
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change Commission ("Commission" or "SEC") and foreign securities regulators
have adjusted their regulation to this new reality. However, they have not yet fully
needed to take the next step in regulation for an international securities market:
fashioning workable consistent international norms for securities regulation.
Securities regulation in the international context entails legitimate interests of
more than one state. Regulators must reconcile the tensions between possibly
conflicting national goals and procedures, on the one hand, with the need for
uniformity in international regulation, on the other. Differences between states
may present very substantial obstacles to international cooperation, particularly
where core values are involved. 5 Nevertheless, each securities market could now
potentially compete with all markets in other countries, some of which profit
from these regulatory variations. Rather than serving as a goad to lessening all
regulation, however, this competition may highlight the fact that certain as-
surances are necessary to attract foreign investors to a market. For example,
virtually all states seek in some fashion to assure depth and stability in their
market through domestic regulation. 6 At the same time, as we shall discuss, the
depth and liquidity of a domestic market to an increasing degree are affected by
the actions of foreign traders. Thus, as in many other situations, the increasing
internationalization of securities markets should be an impetus to regulatory
cooperation. Securities regulators have only begun to explore how to construct
international agreements for this cooperation.
This article examines the experience of the SEC in securities regulation with
respect to the international securities markets, focusing first as background upon
After the worldwide market crash of October 1987, the pace of international offerings declined
considerably, amounting to only $498 million for that month - which was still 250% of the annual
total only four years previously. Id.; SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 11-53.
5. For example, the United States places an almost unique premium on the protection of the small
investor. Related to this focus is the emergence of a potential new factor in foreign markets which may
bring the policy purposes of foreign regulators closer to those of the United States: the increased role
of the small investor in foreign securities markets. The U.S., with 47 million individual investors, has
always had active market participation by small investors. Stockmarket Brief, THE ECONOMIST, Oct.
24, 1987, at 84. The recent international bull market in securities, along with the privatization
programs of France and the United Kingdom, has attracted unprecedented numbers of small investors
to those domestic markets: British stock ownership has boomed from two million individual British
holders in 1980 to nine million in 1987, or roughly 20 percent of the adult population. Id. French
stock ownership tripled by 1986, with about 15 percent, or 9.5 million, of the French population now
holding stock. Id.; French Flock to Buy Stocks, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1987, at D4.
6. See, e.g., the discussion of prerequisites for international securities trading in D. AYLING, THE
INTERNATIONALISATION OF STOCKMARKETS 129-31 (1986). The author points out that markets need
both sophisticated mechanisms and thorough and reliable regulation in order "to attract business of an
international nature." See generally id. at 115-136, in which the author surveys world stock markets
and at 196-211, in which the author concludes, inter alia, that "[t]here is increasing recognition of the
need to provide information and services that are equally acceptable to domestic and foreign clients,"
(id. at 198), and, in reference to the capital markets, that "the future stability and safety of the world
economy . . . [requires] a unified approach .... " id. at 210.
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recent developments in those markets, and then on the actual regulation of issuer
disclosure, the trading markets, and enforcement in general. In each of the latter
three areas, the article will consider the Commission's direct domestic actions in
response to international trade, and compare those with international approaches
to establish standards in these areas. This comparison demonstrates that interna-
tional cooperation can, and should, develop new protections and predictable,
common themes of regulation, for disclosure, market regulation, and
enforcement.
BACKGROUND: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
SECURITIES MARKETS
International securities trading today, while considerable and growing, is very
likely only the shadow of things to come. For several reasons, it has not yet
produced major disruptions of domestic patterns of securities regulation. First,
the market is primarily institutional, and operates largely outside of domestic
regulation; second, many current "international" transactions only involve two
states, which can work together to regulate the transactions;7 and finally-per-
haps most importantly-the media for international trading are limited. Nonethe-
less, recent events presage important regulatory questions which may likely
accompany the future development of the international securities market. Among
the most significant are how to maintain depth and liquidity, and how to protect
small investors in domestic markets from the vagaries of the global institutional
market.
A. Nature of the International Securities Market
Internationalization has not yet fundamentally altered the structure or pattern
of the major equities markets, which remain mostly domestic in nature.8 Rather,
7. See generally SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 11-55 to 11-58.
The most mature international market, the Eurobond market (see SEC STAFF REPORT V-4 to V-18),
has begun to outgrow this bi-national description. Thus, two British authors describe a typical issue in
the Eurobond market:
The mandate to issue a bond issue may be won by a firm's French operation. It would be
launched in London, but might be sold mainly to Continental investors by a sales force outside
London ... [T]he swap transaction which actually makes the deal profitable for the issuing
house might be arranged in Japan.
Nicoll and Wolman, Picking up the pieces of financial freedom, Fin. Times, Feb. 13, 1988, at 8,
col. l.
8. See D. AYLING, supra note 6. This is illustrated by a suit recently filed by the Commission, SEC
v. Zico Investment Holdings, Inc., No. 87-8487 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 2, 1987). The defendants are a
corporation in the British Virgin Islands, and another of unknown nationality with contacts in the
U.K., a British citizen resident in the United States, a British citizen resident in the U.K., and a
British citizen resident in France. The Commission alleged that the defendants placed orders from
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in the securities context, "internationalization" is still basically a function of
improved international communications. Thus, securities trading in any major
world market responds to information from all quarters, foreign and domestic. At
the same time, international institutions maintain traders in strategic cities (e.g.,
New York, London and Tokyo) specializing in the securities of one country, to
trade "24-hour books," using improved international communications to obtain
and monitor their diversified international portfolios.9 This trading allows large
individual and institutional investors to act upon information in any open market
which trades the securities they follow. " Similarly, communication makes it
possible for "world-class" issuers to distribute securities in countries other than
their domiciliary states, because potential purchasers are assured that they will be
able to keep up to date about the issuer.
While fundamental changes are still in the future, the impact of foreign trading
on domestic markets should not be minimized. For example, "a third of the
turnover in the ten main stocks in each of the continental European markets now
takes place in London."" In 1987, foreigners owned about one-third of the
securities traded on the Hong Kong market; 2 a one-week closure of the Hong
Kong market that fall directly produced heavy selling of securities listed in Hong
Kong on the nearby markets of Australia and Singapore. 3
Unfortunately, in comparison to the free flow of information, many of the
France, through an account in London, in order to manipulate the price on the American Stock
Exchange of the shares of a U.S. issuer. In this fact pattern, the issuer was registered in the U.S. and
its equity securities were traded on a U.S. exchange. Despite the variety of nationalities and resi-
dences, the only significant international element is one of communications arising from the location
of the defendants - and the logistical problems in pursuing an action against them.
Formidable as it may be to investigate and prosecute an action such as this one over which the
United States clearly has jurisdiction, but where the evidence may be outside our borders, it does not
raise the whole broad range of legal questions which lurk in the concept of internationalization of the
securities markets along the lines described supra note 7 with respect to the Eurobond market.
9. Global Traders, Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1987, at I, col. 6; Hunter, The Status and Evolution of
Twenty-four Hour Trading: A Trader's View of International Transactions, Clearance, and Settlement,
4 B.U. INT'L L. J. 15 (1986) contains a particularly informative description of trading the 24-hour
book.
10. See Ruttel, Slicing Up the Globe, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIGESr, Dec. 14, 1987, at 16,
describing transactions of hundreds of millions of dollars executed on the international markets by
large investment firms.
I1. Stockmarket Brief, supra note 5. This was recently accentuated when domestic traders were
unable to execute on the continental European markets during the crash, and moved their business,
particularly for French and Japanese equities, to London. Forman, London Market for Non-British
Stocks Is Growing Rapidly in Time of Turmoil, Wall St. J., Nov. 2, 1987, at 39, col.1. See also
Lascelles, Bank takesfirm line on market discipline, Fin. Times, Mar. I, 1988, at 12.
12. Kristof, Plunge Unnerves Hong Kong, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1987, at DI, col.3.
13. Ryan, Sapped in Sydney, INSrITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Feb. 1988, at 173; Witcher and Patrick,
Australian Stocks Take A Worse Beating Than Most as Overseas Investors Get Out, Wall St. J., Nov.
2, 1987, at 49, col. 2; Berthelsen, Singapore Suffered Asia's Sharpest Drop, But Lessons of Past Help
Market Survive, Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 1987, at 32, col. 1.
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mechanics of the international securities marketplace are inadequate at best. With
at least ten percent of the floor trading in New York, London, and Tokyo effected
for foreign securities investors, 4 improved international quotation, trading, and
settlement mechanisms are essential. Nonetheless, delays and inconsistencies in
international settlement procedures have become major obstacles to international
securities trade. One report notes that while local settlement rules vary from one
day (Hong Kong) to one month after the trade (France), 40 to 60 percent of
international security transactions routinely fail to clear within the time limits of
the exchange's home country. 5
B. International Regulatory Issues Highlighted by the October 1987
Market Break
The worldwide market break of October 1987 underscored just how fragile
international securities trading can be. One of the most alarming matters to come
to light is the sudden lack of liquidity available for international trading.' 6 In
October 1987, when the brokerage firms and banks through which most interna-
tional trading is done were unwilling to provide the international markets more
capital, 7 foreign investments were repatriated. 8 On October 19, 1987, American
broker-dealer Charles Schwab Corp. was caught short when a Hong Kong trader
could not meet margin calls on trading losses of $84 million. Schwab was forced
14. Burgess, Sun Never Sets on the World's Linked Markets, Wash. Post, Nov. 1, 1987, at HI,
col.4.
15. Bottleneck for Foreign Stock, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1987 at 37. See Hong Kong's Exchange,
After the Fall, Wall St. J., Nov. 3, 1987, at 34, col.2. In another example, two recent articles in the
AMERICAN BANKER point out that unsettled deals in all transactions on the International Stock
Exchange (ISE) in London as of July 1987 amounted to 679 million pounds, or over $1 billion. Rowe,
Spiraling Trading Volumes and Roman, High Tech Clogs Clearing System, AM. BANKER, Dec. 18,
1987, at 16. Even so, the MARKET BREAK REPORT quoted news articles that the ISE experienced only
its usual 15% level of failures to clear on the first settlement day after the crash of October 19, 1987.
MARKET BREAK REPORT, supra note 4, at 11-9 n.28.
The very nature of the fortnightly British settlement system is, as the governor of the Bank of
England has observed, potentially destabilizing in the event of another sharp fall in prices because
parties to a transaction would have to wait up to a full two weeks to settle while the market may
continue to fall. Wolman, Bank Governor calls for reconsideration of SE account system, Fin. Times,
Feb. 12, 1988, at 1, col.3. In fact, the Chairman of the ISE has now suggested that this system needs
change. Wolman, London SE chief backs account system criticism, Fin. Times, Feb. 25, 1988, at 19.
16. Lohr, Investors Retreating From Foreign Markets, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1987, at Al; Jenkins,
'88: A Year of Global Investment, Wash. Times, Dec. 29, 1987, at IC.
17. Smith and Ricks, Stock Swings Blamed on Dealer Caution, Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1988, at 6.
18. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 13; Hinden, Market Plunge Cooled Foreign Investment, Wash.
Post, Feb. 11, 1988, at DI0, col.2; see also Roth, Exchanges See Plans Ruined Across Europe in
Crash's Wake, Wall St. J., Jan. 4, 1988, at 8B; Short, Funds sold overseas holdings after crash, Fin.
Times, Mar. 24, 1988, at 10; Confidence remains distant memory, Fin. Times, Apr. 18, 1988, at 36.
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to take a $22 million after-tax charge.' 9 Jeffries Group, Inc., the parent of an
American registered broker-dealer, reported a $9.7 million pre-tax loss for Oc-
tober as a result of a default by a British investor.20 The loss of liquidity in the
international market after the market break compels world regulators to consider
today how to assure liquidity in the main trading markets in the future.
2'
The domestic financial and political implications of the worldwide break have
been equally important. For example, the French government delayed a privatiza-
tion offering of the securities of Compagnie Financiere de Suez because the
October break had depressed London grey-market prices on the security well
below the government offering price. 22 The British, on the other hand, despite a
drop in British Petroleum share prices, could not afford to stop their privatization
offering of British Petroleum securities without significant harm to the national
budget for the next three years .23 This drop left the international (U.S., Cana-
dian, and Japanese) underwriting syndicate for that offering locked into a price
estimated to be as much as $1.2 billion over the prevailing market. 24 Ultimately,
the British government agreed to purchase any shares at the price prevailing on
the offering date. Pursuant to that agreement, it purchased under 2 percent of the
shares offered. 25 Subsequent privatization efforts were, however, temporarily
postponed. 26 The U.K. plans its first privatization offering since the break for
some time after the fall of 1988.27 France has announced plans to "resume
privatization" in May of 1989.28
Of particular importance to the U.S. is small investors' vulnerability to the risk
of the international institutional markets, demonstrated amply by the break.
Major U.S. institutional traders began to sell their holdings overseas before the
U.S. markets opened on October 19,29 and continued to make decisions which
19. Investor Linked to Schwab Loss Named in Papers, Wall St. J., -Nov. 2, 1987, at 3; MARKET
BREAK REPORT at 5-6.
20. Miller, Kaiser Tech Sues Its Chairman, Clore, For Alleged Securities-Law Violations, Wall St.
J., March 2, 1988, at 16.
21. Gerth, A Push for International Market Rules, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1987, at D3.
22. Greenhouse, Stocks Fall Sharply Abroad, N.Y. Times, Nov. I1, 1988, at DI, DIli, col.3. The
grey market trades an issue in advance of the offering date at discount prices. SEC STAFF REPORT,
111-38 to 111-39, n.67.
23. Resolute London, Wall St. J., Oct. 30, 1987, at 1, col.l.
24. The resulting crisis illustrated, and resulted from, differences in U.S. and U.K. underwriting
practices. In the U.K., placements are made immediately after an offer is open; in the U.S.,
underwriters are required to make the offering for a period of time until the offer becomes effective
and the securities can be placed. See Plapinger and Morrissey, U.S. and U.K. Underwriting Mechan-
ics: A Comparison, 2 INSIGHTs 2 (Apr. 1988).
25. Bank of England to Buy 39 Million BP Shares, Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 1988, at 24, col.3.
26. MARKET BREAK REPORT, supra at 11-20.
27. Raines, Privatisation Faces Test in Britain, N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1988, at D13, col. 1.
28. Graham, Balladur Plans Quick Start to Privatisation, Fin. Times, Mar. 3, 1988, at 3.
29. One U.S. institution sold $90 million of foreign stocks in London before the New York Stock
Exchange opened that day. Lambert, Two Days in October, Fin. Times, Feb. 13, 1988, at FT-I, col.2.
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controlled the U.S. market's performance in the next few days. In contrast, it
appears that the activities of small investors made no difference to the behavior of
the U.S. markets, both because they were unable to get their orders executed and
because, once executed, their orders did not affect the market in the same
fashion.30 Foreign observers of the U.S. markets remarked that as a consequence,
"[t]he individual investor [who account[s] for about 60 percent of investment in
the U.S. equity market] simply disappeared."'"
C. Post-Break Proposals on International Regulation
Although it is still difficult to predict how the international securities market
will develop and, in particular, what changes will result from the break, it is
becoming apparent that international agreement in certain areas is essential. As
mentioned above, recent experience strongly underscores the need for interna-
tional agreements and guarantees on quotation, trading, clearance and settle-
ment, and capital adequacy.32
Many of the points made about the October break are equally valid in the U.S.
domestic and the international markets. Commentators on the U.S. market after
the crash focused on mechanisms for quotation, trading, liquidity, and clearance.
They criticized both the U.S. exchanges and the over the counter market for the
unreliability of quotations entered into the intermarket media, and the un-
availability of market makers to enter into trades. Similar criticisms have been
levelled at the International Stock Exchange (ISE) in London.33 Regional U.S.
stock exchanges were unable to obtain timely quotations or trade information
from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) on the automated intermarket
30. Coil, Fidelity Executives Angered By Report of Oct. 19 Selloff, Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 1988, at
H4, col. 1.
31. Bush, Suddenly, individuals count, Fin. Times, Feb. 6, 1988, at FT-III. Accord, Power,
Indexes, Buffeted by Investor Dearth, Fall Nonetheless, Wall St. J., March 15, 1988, at 47; Confi-
dence remains a distant memory, supra note 20. This phenomenon is most apparent in the U.S., since
less average foreign household wealth is invested in securities in the foreign markets than in the U.S.
See supra note 5.
32. MARKET BREAK REPORT, supra note 4 at 11-21 to 11-22. The Report observes that "without
effective . . .[clearance and settlement systems and linkages], all firms engaging in international
securities business will be exposed to greater risk." Id. at 11-21 (footnote omitted). In addition, the
Report calls for international trade and quote reporting mechanisms and adequate financial oversight
systems, as well as enforcement and surveillance arrangements.
33. Trades in that marketplace often have to be placed by telephone, and critics complained that
brokers were not answering their telephones. See MARKET BREAK REPORT supra note 4 at 11-9 to
11-10. In a report issued in February, 1988, the ISE concluded that charges that ISE brokers were not
answering telephones on October 17 were "basically unfounded", but acknowledged that ISE se-
curities dealers could not handle the volume of trading that week. Lohr, Index Arbitrage is Backed,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1988, at D13. London market makers were also allowed to reduce their exposure
by significantly limiting the number of shares any quotation they put into quotation media committed
them to buy. MARKET BREAK REPORT supra note 4 at 11-10 to 11-12.
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trading system, and complained that they could not effect trades through NYSE
specialists. Indeed, trade volume may have shifted from the less-automated but
more heavily capitalized NYSE to the more-automated, less-capitalized, regional
exchanges.3 4 The New York Stock Exchange has since imposed significantly
higher capital requirements on its specialists, who perform as market makers.35
The report of the President's Task Force on Market Mechanisms, the "Brady
Report", called for the unification of all stock and futures clearance in one
agency to reduce credit risks.36 To bring the matter full circle, the Director of the
Commission's Division of Market Regulation observed that insufficient capital of
both NYSE and London market-makers was a significant contributor to market
imbalances in U.S. securities during the break.37
The governor of the Bank of England has responded to all these charges by
calling for increased international coordination of securities regulation.38 Busi-
ness Week also called for international securities regulators to "harmoniz[e] the
various national laws governing disclosure and enforcement." 39 The New York
Times decried a lack of "adequate supervision and understanding of the global
markets", and urged "[c]loser coordination, more unified trading systems and
more standard trading practices .... ,,40
In a recent speech to a business group in Tokyo, the Chairman of the SEC
joined the call for international coordination, with particular respect to disclosure
standards, guarantees of market fairness, quotation and price information, clear-
ance and settlement, broker-dealer standards, capital adequacy standards, and
enforcement measures. He also mentioned auditing and accounting standards,
insider trading, market manipulation, misrepresentation, broker-dealer conduct
standards, and market surveillance. He called on regulators "to adapt the best
rules and policies of each nation to new market structures and trading
strategies. ,41
Thus, the need for international regulation in the securities markets is growing,
34, Flynn, Regional Exchanges Grumble, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1987, at Dl, col.3.
35. Widder, NYSE market makers must beef up capital, Chi. Trib., Apr. 8, 1988, at I. The concern
with capital is highlighted by the fact that the crash drove 10% of the index and option traders in the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange out of the market. Kreca and Ladernan, If You Think New York Has It
Bad, Take A Look At Chicago, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 30, 1987, at 132.
36. Branding the Guilty, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 16, 1988, at 70.
37. Vise, Studies Aim to Clear Muddy Waters of Stock Market Plunge, Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 1987,
at H 1, col.2; see also Ferry, London Exchange Official Calls for Unified Regulation, Wash. Post, Feb.
12, 1988, at H3, reporting that, while the Bank of England concluded that U.K. brokers were net
buyers of securities on October 19, U.K. fund managers complained that they could not effect
transactions on the ISE that week, and thus directed their business to the NYSE.
38. Global Bank Rules to Limit Securities Risks Are Urged, Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1988, at 43.
39. Securities Rules Need To Go Global, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 28, 1987, at 248.
40. Cash, A New Urgency for Reforms in Policing Securities Trades, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1987,
at Al, D4.
41. D. Ruder, The October Market Break: A Stimulant to United States-Japanese Cooperative
Securities Regulation, Speech before Keidanran in Tokyo (Feb. 18, 1988).
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while many of the interests individual states would seek to further are becoming
similar. In this context, the prospects for international cooperation in the regula-
tion of issuer disclosure, and the trading markets, as well as in enforcement
efforts in general, appear favorable. As will be seen, the Securities and Exchange
Commission has attempted a variety of independent domestic initiatives on these
three fronts. 42 Although the Commission has made important accommodations to
international securities trade in this fashion, this approach is limited. The Com-
mission's Division of Market Regulation recently observed that "securities reg-
ulators around the world [must now] cooperate to ensure the integrity of our
markets .... 43
ISSUER DISCLOSURE IN THE U.S.; INITIAL DISTRIBUTIONS,
SECONDARY MARKETS, AND THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES
MARKET
One of the threshold questions presented to a U.S. regulator by the interna-
tionalization of the securities markets is how to reconcile foreign issuer
disclosure practices with the disclosure requirements of U.S. law. Issuers of
securities registered in the United States have broad, and recurrent, disclosure
obligations under federal law, often broader than required by either practice or
law in other countries. These U.S. issuer disclosure standards are central to the
scheme of the federal securities laws.
In some respects, the Commission has unilaterally adapted U.S. disclosure
requirements and investor protection to accommodate conflicting foreign practice
or law. The ultimate development of uniform international standards for issuer
disclosure on a multilateral basis-endorsed by many observers-will have to
continue to accomplish this in a unified fashion while fulfilling the Commission's
overarching obligation to protect U.S. investors.
A. Current U.S. Regulation
Under the federal securities laws, any issuer that uses United States jurisdic-
tional means" to sell its securities is obligated to register those securities with the
Commission. In addition, an issue traded in interstate commerce that crosses a
threshold number for the size of its U.S. securities market and for the company's
assets, 45 is obligated to register its securities with the Commission. 46 In design
42. For a brief overview of internationalization and U.S. regulation, see Longstreth and Randolph,
Internationalisation of Capital Markets, 16 INT'L Bus. LAW. 20-24 (Jan. 1988).
43. MARKET BREAK REPORT, supra note 4, at 11-21.
44. The jurisdictional means are defined in the securities laws as interstate commerce and the
mails. See Securities Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1982).
45. See Securities Exchange Act § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1982).
46. The issuer of any class of securities registered under the Securities Exchange Act must then
make periodic reports in order to ensure the timeliness of publicly available data.
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and in practice, however, this comprehensive scheme permits certain exceptions
from registration where the U.S. is deemed to have a minimal interest in dictating
the necessary disclosure.4 1 Some of these exceptions are particularly relevant to
the international securities market, and the Securities and Exchange Commission
has relied upon these concepts in fashioning some of its initiatives to accommo-
date U.S. registration requirements to the increased international trade in
securities.
1. Registration Requirements and International Transactions Exempt from
Registration
A broad range of offers or sales of securities is subject to the registration
requirements of U.S. law. In general, registration is required under the Securities
Act of 1933 whenever any person directly or indirectly "make[s] use of any
means or instruments . . . of interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such
security .... -48 Interstate commerce includes "trade or commerce in securities
or any transportation or communication relating thereto . . . between any foreign
country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia .... -49 In addi-
tion, whenever an issuer's securities are listed on a registered securities ex-
change, and the issuer has over five million dollars in assets and a class of
securities held by more than 300 U.S. persons, it must register the security
pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.50
As mentioned above, the statutory concept of registration envisions that certain
sales of securities through the jurisdictional means need not be registered. In this
vein, issuers that offer or sell to a limited number of sophisticated investors may
not have to register the securities under the 1933 Act.5" Fundamentally, an issuer
47. Many exceptions, for example, embody notions of comity. Thus, the Securities Act provides
that intrastate offerings, presumably regulated by the states, are exempt from registration. Securities
Act § 3(a)(ll), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1982). Similarly, securities issued by banking institutions
subject to state or federal regulation need not be registered. Securities issued by municipalities,
states, and the federal government, or pursuant to certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code,
are also exempt from registration. Securities Act § 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1982).
48. Securities Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1982).
49. Securities Act § 2(7), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(7) (1982).
50. Securities Exchange Act § 12(b), 12(g), 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(b) and 781(g) (1982); Rules 17g-l and
12g3-2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12g-l and 240.12g3-2 (1987). The National Association of Securities
Dealers also requires the issuers of securities which are to be traded in its NASDAQ over-the-counter
system to register those securities with the Commission.
51. The concept of a sophisticated investor is long-recognized in the scheme of the federal
securities laws, which have always allowed certain transactions with sophisticated investors to be
exempt from registration. One definition of a sophisticated investor is contained in Rule 506 of
Regulation D under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.ER. § 230.506 (1987). Rule 506(b)(ii) provides
that: "the issuer [in certain exempt transactions] shall reasonably believe immediately prior to making
any sale that each purchaser who is not an accredited investor ... has such knowledge and experi-
ence in financial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the
prospective investment;" see, e.g., Wolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 E2d 591, 612 (5th Cir. 1975)
(defining "sophisticated investor" as an individual capable of evaluating the merits and risk of the
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who engages in the "sale of an issue of securities to ...a limited group of
experienced investors ...52 is not required to satisfy the particularized dis-
closure protections of the securities laws. The issuer would, however, still be
subject to the antifraud liability imposed by the federal securities laws. Other
securities transactions on the secondary market are exempt from registration if
they meet the standards of a concept dubbed as "Section 4(IV2)", referring to two
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 which provide for exempt transactions.
5 3
In addition to securities that are exempt from registration under the Securities
Act by design, certain other securities in the international marketplace may,
pursuant to Commission policy, be offered without registration. The Commission
has long taken the position that securities offered or sold to non-U.S. persons in
such a manner that they "come to rest" abroad-even if through interstate
commerce (and thus within the scope of the registration provisions of the Se-
curities Act)-need not be registered with the Commission. The Commission
will not take enforcement action whenever securities are sold under circum-
stances reasonably designed to prevent the distribution or redistribution of the
securities into the U.S. or to U.S. persons.
5 4
prospective investment); see generally L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION
382-92 (1983) (discussing offeree qualifications in private placements).
A concept similar to "sophisticated investor" is "accredited investor." Section 2(15) of the Se-
curities Act provides a two part definition of "accredited investor." First, Section 2(15)(i) sets forth
various financial institutions that are "accredited investors." Second, Section 2(15)(ii) provides the
relevant criteria for determining when an individual is an "accredited investor." The rule states that an
"accredited investor" is any person who, based on such factors as financial sophistication, net worth,
knowledge, experience or amount of assets, qualifies as an accredited investor under rules and
regulations which the Commission shall prescribe. Securities Act § 2(15), 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(15)
(1982). See also, Gilberg, Regulation of New Financial Instruments Under the Federal Securities and
Commodities Laws, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1599 (1986) (discussing the definition and significance of
accredited investors).
52. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 37
(1959).
In many instances, intemational securities transactions which use United States jurisdictional
means involve transactions which are exempt from registration under the Securities Act, particularly
private sales to sophisticated investors, see supra note 51 and accompanying text. However, as the
international securities markets grow, increased U.S. trading in unregistered foreign issues could
trigger the registration requirements of the Securities Exchange Act, which relate to the size of the
U.S. trading market for the security.
53. See Vaughn, The Section "(4 1 )" Phenomenon: Private Resales of "Restricted" Securities,
34 Bus. LAW. 1961 (1979).
In addition, individuals who obtain restricted securities as defined by Rule 144 under the Securities
Act may engage in limited resales of those securities without the need to register them. Rule 144, 17
C.F.R. § 230.144 (1987), allows the resale of unregistered securities with certain restrictions. The
Rule depends, among other things, upon the public availability of adequate current information of the
sort required by the Commission's periodic reporting rules.
54. 29 Fed. Reg. 9828, Securities Act Rel. No. 4708 (July 22, 1964). The release specifically
refers to a U.S. issuer, but it would apply to a foreign issuer as well.
Another situation which may legitimately avoid the reach of the U.S. securities laws occurs when
64 INTERNATIONALIZATION OF SECURITIES MARKETS
In response to this policy, the securities bar has developed standard procedures
to prevent securities from coming to rest in the United States, and to allow for
limited registration by individual shareholders of "flow-back securities" pur-
chased in unregistered offerings overseas and resold in the U.S. 5 While this
accommodation is helpful to issuers in the international markets seeking to avoid
running afoul of U.S. registration requirements, it does not address the fact that,
in some cases, U.S. investors have been excluded from purchasing securities in
foreign offerings. The anomaly is that U.S. persons interested in obtaining these
securities products are able to obtain the same product on a secondary market
(foreign or even U.S.) after a waiting period-often on less favorable terms.
5 6
The unfairness of such a state of affairs is highlighted in the case of rights
offerings made to everyone but U.S. persons.
57
To meet this sort of objection, the Commission and its staff have expanded the
concept of non-integration which was first introduced in 1964, i.e., that essen-
tially foreign distributions need not be registered, even where there are sales to
sophisticated investors in the U.S.58 In particular, the staff has recently issued
several no-action letters59 indicating that it would not recommend enforcement
action with respect to specific foreign offerings contemporaneous to private
placements in the U.S. In one letter, the staff indicated, in effect, that those
foreign bidders in tender offers for primarily foreign securities with a small secondary market in the
United States sidestep the jurisdictional means and U.S. investors. Thus, a tender offeror who is not a
citizen or resident of the United States and uses no means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce
or U.S. exchanges is not subject to the U.S. requirement that it extend its offer to all security holders
who own shares of the security subject to the offer. 51 Fed. Reg. 32630 (1986); see Plessey Co. PLC
v. General Electric Co. PLC, 628 F. Supp. 477 (D. Del. 1986). See generally, The Extraterritorial
Application of U.S. Securities Law in the Absence of Fraud Charges: Plessey v. GEC, 18 L. & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 649, 655-64 (1986) (observing that the United States courts are more likely to extend
U.S. jurisdiction extraterritorially in instances of fraud than in purely regulatory ones, like
registration).
55. For a general description of these practices, see Adee, Flow-back Registration Statements, 2
INSIGHTS 10 (Apr. 1988).
56. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note I at 111-315 to 111-317, VB-25.
57. In a no-action letter to the College Retirement Equities Fund dated June 4, 1987, the Division
of Corporation Finance took the position that the exercise of preemptive rights by U.S. institutional
investors that had originally purchased a foreign offeror's securities in a U.S. private offering would
not be integrated with an unregistered foreign offering. Thus, the Commission's policy in that
instance made it possible for the U.S. investors to participate in the rights offering made to foreign
investors without requiring the issuer to implement the standard procedures designed to prevent
"coming to rest" in the U.S. See College Retirement Equities Fund, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 78,508; (June 4, 1987),
58. See Securities Act Rel. No. 4708, supra, note 54.
59. A no-action letter is an indication from the Commission staff, based upon a particular set of
facts described to it by a member of the public, whether it would recommend enforcement action if
presented with that situation. See generally, Lemke, The SEC No-Action Letter Process, 42 Bus.
LAW. 1019 (1987).
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specific foreign offerings made to non-United States persons would not be inte-
grated with separate private placements in the U.S. which are exempt from
registration, even though a secondary market in the security existed or might
come into existence in the United States. The issuers were, therefore, not obli-
gated to take any precautions other than those that would be required in the
absence of a U.S. private offering, to prevent securities sold in the foreign
offering from coming to rest in the United States. 6°
In another letter, the staff agreed, for instance, that those offerors would not be
required to take additional affirmative precautions to prevent the development of
a U.S. market, and that the U.S. purchasers in concurrent U.S. private place-
ments would be able to resell their securities on the French Bourse without any
obligation to prevent further sales to U.S. purchasers. Those letters allowed a
small number of sophisticated U.S. investors to purchase unregistered securities
in a private placement which were simultaneously subject to a public offering
outside the United States, without registration of the security in the U. S.61 How-
ever, the staff has since refused to issue similar assurances with respect to
transactions in London, Toronto, and Vancouver.62 In one unique situation, the
Commission's staff took a no-action position with respect to French privatization
transactions. In that situation, a small number of U.S. institutional investors
would receive securities through private placements in the U.S. At the same time,
French law required that offers to purchase the securities be made to all residents
of France without regard to citizenship. The staff stated that the U.S. private
placements would not be integrated with the French offerings, and that, in view
of the requirements of the French law, the staff would not recommend action even
though sales in that offering might be made to U.S. citizens resident abroad.
63
The Commission's 1964 release which sets forth the circumstances in which
issues through United States jurisdictional means that do not come to rest in the
U.S. need not be registered is reportedly under review by the Commission staff.
64
The staff is reported to be considering a "safe harbor" for offers or sales made
wholly outside U.S. territory. This would look to whether the issuer is a report-
ing company, whether there is an active U.S. market in its securities, and
whether its securities can be registered on Commission Forms S-3 or F-3 .65
60. College Retirement Equities Fund, SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 18, 1987); (available in SEC
files) College Retirement Equities Fund, SEC No-Action Letter See also supra note 57.
61. See Chubb and Kelly, SEC No-Action Letter Relaxes the Market, 6 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 21 (Apr.
1987).
62. ALI-ABA Panel Discusses Insider Trading Developments, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No.
4, at 132, 135 (Jan. 29, 1988) [hereinafter ALI.ABA].
63. French Privatization Program, SEC No-Action Letter, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 78,439 (April 17, 1987).
64. Securities Act Rel. No. 4708, see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
65. See ALI-ABA, supra note 62, at 134.
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2. Disclosure Requirements for Foreign Issuers
The situations discussed above concern those in which foreign securities need
not be registered in the United States. The issuer of securities which must be
registered in the United States, whether foreign or domestic, must disclose
certain information both in the registration statement and in periodic reports
designed for regular and timely updating. 6 6 Periodic disclosure generally includes
annual and quarterly reports, as well as special reports of material events. The
Commission has undertaken a number of steps to accommodate the breadth of
U.S. disclosure requirements to the particular problems of foreign issuers of
securities which must be registered in the United States.
In specific, the Commission's registration forms for foreign issuers have been
modified to reduce the cost of producing United States-style financial informa-
tion. The Commission allows foreign issuers to provide substantially similar
general information as domestic companies, but to present their financial state-
ments in the form generally accepted in their domicile state, provided they
reconcile variations from United States accounting and regulation. 67 In addition,
foreign issuers may in certain offerings provide less information than domestic
ones regarding such disclosure items as industry and geographic segments, com-
pensation to management, and transactions with management.
Form 6-K, for periodic disclosure, requires only that issuers disclose in the
U.S. any information that they must, or they have, made public abroad. Form 20-
F for annual disclosure is modeled on the annual disclosure required of a domes-
tic issuer, but a foreign issuer may present foreign financial statements with a
reconciliation to U.S. rules. 61 Similarly, a foreign bidder making a tender offer
for securities registered in the United States may use financial statements in
compliance with Form 20-F
69
66. See Haseltine, International Regulations of Securities Markets: Interaction Between United
States and Foreign Laws, 36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 307, 308 (1987). See, e.g., Securities Act § 5, 15
U.S.C. § 77e (1982), and Securities Exchange Act §§ 13 and 15(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m and 78o (1982).
67. Form 20-F, Items 17 and 18, [vol.4] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 29,701, at 29,724 (Dec. 13,
1982). See Form F-I for initial private offerings, Forms F-2 and F-3 for previously registered se-
curities, Form F-4 for business combinations, and Form F-6 for registration of American Depositary
Shares. [Vol.2] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 6951, 6961-7001 (July 13, 1983). Audits conducted for
SEC filings must meet U.S. standards. However, audits conducted in accordance with the standards of
Canada, the U.K., Australia, and New Zealand are generally considered to meet U.S. standards.
68. For a discussion of Form 20-F, see Seligman, The Internationalization of the Securities
Markets: Preface to a Symposium, IX MICH. Y. B. INT'L LEGAL. STUD. 1 (1988).
69. See Rule 14d-6(e)(ix) under the Securities Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-6(e)(ix) (1987). A
foreign bidder has certain additional disclosure obligations arising out of its citizenship. It must
disclose, in its offering materials, any foreign regulations which might restrict the future conduct of
business. Similarly, where an offer for a registered foreign security is subject to foreign laws
restricting control of the issuer, the offering materials must contain adequate disclosure of those laws.
See Item 10(b) of Schedule 14D-I under the Securities Exchange Act, 17 C.ER. § 240.14d-100 (1987);
SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 111-306 to 111-307.
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The disclosure required of certain foreign issuers has also been affected by
other Commission initiatives. The Commission has significantly adapted its over-
all disclosure system to allow incorporation by reference to information filed in
periodic reports in registration documents for issuers which meet general require-
ments of size and reporting history.70 Although this does not simplify the issuer's
periodic disclosure obligations, it does simplify registration under the 1933 Act.
The Commission will also, in certain circumstances, allow continuous or delayed
offerings of securities based on a single registration statement. 7" These important
structural changes in U.S. disclosure obligations extend to foreign issuers and
thus relieve part of the registration burden on qualifying foreign issuers.
72
In a similar vein, the Commission recently approved the accommodation of
listing requirements for foreign issuers by U.S. securities exchanges and the
National Association of Securities Dealers. The American Stock Exchange, the
New York Stock Exchange, and the National Association of Securities Dealers'
NASDAQ system rules now permit the listing of foreign issuers which meet U.S.
listing criteria for size and share distribution, but which may be required by the
law of their domiciliary states to provide fewer shareholders rights than are
available to shareholders of U.S. domestic companies.
73
B. Current Proposals Regarding Registration and Disclosure
Requirements
A number of proposals regarding registration and disclosure requirements and
the international securities marketplace are currently under discussion. The Com-
mission has discussed both bilateral and multilateral approaches to registration
and disclosure for international capital formation in a concept release. 74 Other
initiatives currently being pursued focus on the creation of international standards
which will be acceptable to a number of states. While there may be more that the
United States can do in this area individually, the future for disclosure require-
ments in the international securities markets lies with international efforts to-
wards a common, uniform standard of disclosure.
1. Registration Requirements
Two current proposals regarding U.S. law would formalize the circumstances
under which unregistered international securities may be traded in the secondary
70. See Forms S-2, S-3, [vol.21 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 7141, 7151 (Aug. 19, 1987); 17 C.F.R.
§§ 239.12, 13 (1987).
71. Rule 415 under the Securities Act, 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1987).
72. Forms F-2, and F-3, 17 C.F.R. §§ 239.32 and 239.33 (1987), provide that certain foreign
issuers may incorporate periodic disclosures by reference in the registration of securities.
73. Securities Exchange Act Release. No. 24634, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,230 (1987). See Reita and
Lobrano, New U.S. Listing Procedures for Non-U.S. Issuers, 6 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 11 (Sept. 1987).
74. Facilitation of Multinational Securities Offerings, 50 Fed. Reg. 9,281 (1986) [hereinafter
Multinational Offerings Release].
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market through United States jurisdictional means without triggering U.S. regis-
tration requirements. Both these approaches reflect the largely institutional char-
acter of the players in the international securities market.
One approach would create a formal market for these transactions. Press
reports describe plans by the American Stock Exchange and the National Asso-
ciation of Securities Dealers to request no-action letters from the SEC staff to
establish exchanges which would provide "marketplaces" for unregistered inter-
national securities." Reports on these facilities suggest that they would allow
U.S. institutional investors to trade foreign securities that, though unregistered
with the SEC, would meet exchange standards for disclosure and ownership
reports. The facilities would provide clearance and settlement by book entry.
A second approach discussed in the press entails an exemption from registra-
tion for certain securities traded on the institutional block market, including
foreign issues traded in these transactions. The Director of the Commission's
Division of Corporation Finance has stated that the Commission staff is consider-
ing rule changes which would regularize a secondary market in unregistered
securities which would also cover securities traded primarily in international
contexts. 76 The change, known for purposes of discussion as Rule 144A, would
permit resales of securities initially issued in a private placement without registra-
tion under the Securities Act, in one of two general patterns. Qualified investors
could be limited to institutions, as defined by rule or by size, and the securities
limited to nonconvertible investment grade debt, or preferred securities. Alter-
natively, a more restricted group of qualified institutions would be able to trade
freely in any security whose issuer already provides disclosure on a periodic
basis under the Securities Exchange Act, or whose issuer would be willing to
provide certain data upon request.
7
1
75. The American Stock Exchange filed a proposal for that market, an electronic market dubbed
SITUS, with the Commission on December 23, 1987. Cowan, Amex Seeks New Network, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 28, 1987, at DI, col. I; Parker, 2 Exchanges in Works in Foreign Securities, 15 PENSIONS
FOR INV. AGE, 73-74 (1987). Among other things, the Amex proposal might allow U.S. banks to
trade on the exchange through securities subsidiaries. Clough, Amex Off-Shore Exchange Could
Weaken Glass-Steagall Walls, INVESTMENT DEALER'S DiGEST, Feb. 15, 1988, at 8.
76. See, e.g., ALI-ABA, supra note 62; SEC Staff to Work on Developing Safe Harbor Rule for
Foreign Offerings, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 38 at 1444 (Sept. 25, 1987); see also 19 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1242, 1245-6 (Aug. 14, 1987).
77. In order to allow the issuers of unregistered securities trading in this fashion to ensure that they
do not unwittingly acquire an obligation to register their securities under the Securities Exchange Act,
the Commission could allow issuers whose securities are traded on this market an exemption from
registration otherwise required under Securities Exchange Act § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1982),
where the number of non-qualified institutional holders does not exceed a number set by rule. See
Insider Trading, supra note 76, at 1246.
The Commission would have to consider any other disclosure obligations separately, since issuers
which are not required to register their securities would not necessarily be subject to the periodic
disclosure requirements of Section 15(d) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1982). Compare Commis-
sion Rule 12g3-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b) (1987), which provides an exemption from registra-
tion under the Securities Exchange Act for the securities of foreign private issuers who make available
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2. International Disclosure Standards
As noted above, one limitation to the growth of the international securities
market is the absence of common international standards for disclosure. The
Commission has issued a "concept release" to explore the possibility of interna-
tional disclosure norms and regulations. In its Multinational Offerings Release,7"
the Commission proposed two alternative approaches to international registra-
tion. The first alternative would permit the reciprocal registration of certain
securities. Each participating country could allow the use of the offering docu-
ment required in the issuer's home country without requiring extensive recon-
ciliation of accounting and auditing information.79 The release proposed initiating
this reciprocity with the United Kingdom and Canada. Registration would be
available primarily to world class issuers of investment grade debt which are
traded less on their issuer's reported financial position, and more on their current
yields and ratings. Alternatively, the release proposed a common prospectus
approach, essentially an attempt at standardization with those two countries. This
would entail an agreement that an offering document meeting certain disclosure
standards could be used in two or all of the three countries.
A majority of commentators applauded the Commission's initiative. Even
though many believed the common prospectus approach to be the ideal, a major-
ity observed that some type of reciprocal approach was more practical because it
was most easily implemented.
The Multinational Offerings Release is only one of several current initiatives
concerning international disclosure standards. All of these initiatives have to
overcome the same obstacle: the need to reconcile different, and possibly con-
flicting, national policy priorities. 80 This can be done in either of the two ways
to the Commission any information they had filed for or made public with their domiciliary state, to
their shareholders, or to a stock exchange on which their securities are traded.
78. Multinational Offerings Release, supra note 74.
79. The release also contemplated that the procedure might be available for limited rights offers
and exchange offers.
80. For example, one previous international initiative toward multilateral securities regulation
faltered because the United States failed to modify conflicting law. The United States did not adopt
the "Standard Rules for the Operations of Institutions for Collective Investment in Securities," issued
in 1972 by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), setting forth
minimum requirements for the investment management and marketing practices of collective invest-
ment institutions. Released for comment by the Commission in Investment Company Act Release.
No. 8596, 5 SEC Dkt. 640 (Dec. 2, 1974). These rules would have required the Commission to accept
the registration of investment companies that might not meet the standards of the Investment Com-
pany Act. 15 U.S.C. 80b-I to 80b-21 (1982). After declining to adopt the OECD's "Standard Rules,"
the Commission issued a release outlining the minimum standards for a foreign investment company
to register with the Commission under the Act. 7 SEC Dkt. 1002 (Sept. 26, 1975). See generally, SEC
STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at VI-9 to VI-13.
Other legal and regulatory limitations to cooperation are embodied in regulation by some countries
designed to control and insulate domestic markets and currencies. See D. AYLINO, supra note 6, at
32-37.
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proposed by the Multinational Offerings Release, by harmonizing different do-
mestic standards so they are not inconsistent with one another, or by creating new
standards acceptable as a whole to all the participating states. Those international
organizations that have addressed the problem"' have generally opted for
harmonization.
The European Economic Community has begun an ambitious effort to harmo-
nize the corporate and securities laws of its member states, focusing initially on
disclosure.8 2 Since 1978, the EEC's Council of Ministers has issued a series of
Directives concerning collective investment products (such as mutual funds),
exchange listing requirements, accounting and auditing standards, and mutual
recognition of listed security prospectuses. Laws implementing the EEC's ac-
counting and auditing standards8 3 have been adopted by most of its members.
Similarly, most member countries have also complied with the Directives on
listing requirements.8 4 Member countries are expected to comply with the Direc-
81. Both the OECD and the United Nations have surveyed the accounting and auditing practices, as
well as the securities regulation, of member states. (The OECD has 26 members, including the
United States, Japan, Australia, and European states.) The International Organization of Securities
Commissions ("IOSC") has set up five working groups to study multiple listings of securities and
multinational equity offerings; accounting and auditing standards; financial standards for securities
intermediaries; domestic constraints on the international exchange of information; and regulation of
international off-market trading. The members of the IOSC are the securities regulators of Australia,
Canada, France, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
82. See Merloe, Internationalization of Securities Markets, 8 J. COMp. Bus. & CAP. MKT. L. 299,
256-61 (1986).
83. Council Directive of 25 July 1978, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 222) 11 (1978), sets minimum
standards for balance sheets, profits and loss account, and rules for the contents and notes of annual
reports. This was followed up by Council Directive of 13 June 1983, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 193)
I (1983), which sets minimum standards for the layout and contents of reports, and by Council
Directive of 10 April 1984, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 126) 20 (1984), which provides standards for
the testing of auditors and qualification of auditing firms. These EEC standards are not consistent with
similar U.S. standards.
84. Council Directive of 5 March 1979, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 66) 22 (1979), requires
member states to limit stock exchange listing to companies in compliance with their domestic law,
and having a certain minimum capitalization and three years of published or filed financial reports.
The Directive also sets certain minimum requirements for debt offerings and limits the listing of
convertible debt and warrants to companies whose underlying securities are listed on a recognized
exchange. Finally, the Directive requires disclosure to shareholders of annual accounts and material
recent events. Council Directive of 17 March 1980, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 100) 1 (1980), sets
minimum standards for information required from the issuers of listed securities, including a provi-
sion for the publication of material information. The Directive also lists seven areas which must be
covered by publication. In addition, the Directive requires prior approval by competent authorities for
publication, and a delay between publication and the effectiveness of the listing. Council Directive of
15 February 1982, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 48) 26 (1982), requires the publication of so-called
"interim" information by the issuers of securities listed on an exchange.
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tive on minimum standards for disclosure regarding collective investment prod-
ucts and their management by October 1988.85 The Directive on Mutual
Recognition of Prospectus of Admission to the Stock Exchange of June 22,
1987,86 calls for mutual recognition of foreign prospectuses not only within the
Common Market, but also with other states, and is scheduled to become effective
January 1, 1990. The most recent disclosure initiative discussed as of the date of
this writing (May 1988) concerns disclosure, and antitrust regulation, of tender
offers and mergers. 87
International standards for disclosure regulation, as opposed to minima for
harmonization, face a heavier burden in being implemented by the various states,
since they would replace, rather than simply modify, existing regulation. Thus,
for example, efforts to propose and adopt guidelines for international accounting
and auditing principles have proceeded slowly. The International Accounting
Standards Committee (IASC), whose members include 100 organizations from
74 countries, has issued 26 accounting standards in recent years, dealing with the
measurement of assets, liabilities, equity, revenue, and expenses.88 These inde-
pendent standards are not inconsistent with U.S. practices. However, they differ
from United States generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in that they
are more limited than U.S. GAAP in certain ways. At the current time, they are
used only on a voluntary basis, except in Italy and on the International Stock
Exchange, where listed companies are required to apply IASC standards or
explain their deviation from the standards.
The International Audit Practices Committee of the International Federation of
Accountants has issued 24 auditing guidelines, as well as guidelines on profes-
sional ethics and training. The auditing guidelines, again, differ from United
States generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS), but do not conflict with
U.S. GAAS. Since the guidelines were only issued in 1987, it remains to be seen
how they will be accepted.
As this discussion of U.S. issuer registration and disclosure demonstrates, any
domestic securities policy will have to change to meet expanding international
trade, but at some point, the regulation of that trade demands international
coordination. Harnessing the constructive forces of international capital markets
in a unified way, while safeguarding the domestic policy imperatives underlying
disclosure and registration requirements like those of the U.S., will remain one
of the most challenging areas of internationalization of the securities markets.
85. Directive of December 20, 1985, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 611) 3 (1985). The Directive also
addresses financial stability of issuers and annual reports from issuers.
86. 30 0.1. EUR. COMM. (L 185) 81 (1987).
87. Paltrow, Despite Recent Mergers, Takeover Bids, Progress Toward EC-wide Rule is Slow, Wall
St. J., Feb. 18, 1988, at 14, col. 3.
88. In 1984, the IASC merged with the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC).
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III. REGULATION OF BROKER-DEALERS AND SECURITIES EXCHANGES
IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE
As with disclosure, the United States statutory framework for the regulation of
broker-dealers and exchanges begins with a broad statement of jurisdiction. Just
as it has done with respect to issuer disclosure, the Commission has accommo-
dated its administration of the federal securities laws in this area to the increased
internationalization of securities trading. This aspect of securities regulation,
however, has lent itself more readily to international agreements. International
agreements allow each domestic regulator to depend on its foreign counterparts
to provide adequate regulation, and adequate enforcement assistance, when mat-
ters fall within their jurisdiction.
A. Regulation of Broker-Dealers
Securities Exchange Act Section 15(a)89 makes it unlawful for any broker or
dealer9° to make use of the mails or interstate commerce "to effect any transac-
tions in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security"
unless that broker or dealer is registered with the Commission. Registration in
turn subjects the broker-dealer and persons associated with it to comprehensive
regulations designed to protect investors and ensure the integrity of the U.S.
markets. These regulations require investment intermediaries who solicit U.S.
securities transactions to satisfy basic competency, capital and reporting stan-
dards, to comply with customer protection requirements, and to consent to juris-
diction for purposes of SEC enforcement actions. 9' The Commission staff has
traditionally interpreted the registration requirement strictly, and continues to
take the position that any action by a foreign broker-dealer which may be con-
strued as soliciting trades from a U.S. investor subjects that broker-dealer to U.S.
jurisdiction. 92
The Commission staff has accommodated some specific aspects of U.S. reg-
ulation to the business of broker-dealers operating in more than one country. For
example, the underwriters of a distribution of securities are normally prohibited,
during the distribution's pendency, from entering into transactions in the security
(other than the distribution itself) as market makers. 93 U.S. underwriters par-
89. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a) (1982).
90. The terms broker and dealer are defined in Securities Exchange Act §§ 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5), 15
U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(4) and (5) (1982).
91. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at V-41 to V-42.
92. E.g., the staff has indicated that placing advertisements in U.S. newspapers or hosting an
investment seminar in the U.S. would subject a foreign broker-dealer to U.S. registration require-
ments. See Hugh Seymour, Hoare & Govett, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter (September 28, 1973)
(available in SEC files).
93. See e.g., Plapinger and Morrissey, supra note 24. In general terms, a market maker is a dealer
that holds itself out as ready to buy or sell particular securities for its own account on a regular or
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ticipating in global distributions must still comply with the U.S. regulatory
prohibition on active market-making activities in the U.S., but the staff has
agreed that the non-U.S. part of the distribution may, subject to certain condi-
tions, proceed in the ordinary course of business without complying with U.S.
law.94 The staff relies on regulatory safeguards in the U.S. augmented by foreign
regulation, assurances of access to necessary information in the event of an
inquiry, and other restrictions appropriate to the individual offering, to provide a
minimum level of protection. The conditions for this no-action policy limit the
investment advice foreign underwriters give their clients, and require that market
prices be set by independent third parties. In one instance, the Rhone-Poulenc
distribution, the Commission also required compliance with a 9-day "cooling off
period" in light of a concurrent U.S. distribution of 20% of the shares. 95
In other cases where the principal market is not in the U.S., the staff has
permitted market makers to base any stabilizing bids they place in foreign and
U.S. markets on prices set in the principal market.96 All of these actions were
premised upon a representation that the underwriter or affiliate would maintain
records of purchases and make them available to the Commission on request.
In an extension of these approaches, the Commission staff recently agreed to
permit ISE market makers in United Kingdom securities to engage in what was
continuous basis. Securities Exchange Act § 3(a)(38), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(38) (1982) defines a market
maker as any specialist permitted to act as a dealer, any dealer acting in the capacity of block
positioner, and any dealer who, with respect to a security, holds himself out (by entering quotations in
an inter-dealer communications system or otherwise) as being willing to buy and sell such security for
his own account on a regular or continuous basis.
Specifically, Rule 10b-6 under the Securities Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-6 (1987), forbids
persons participating in a distribution of securities, including underwriters, to enter into or induce
others to enter into transactions in the offered security, or a related security, for a period of 2 or 9
business days before the beginning of the distribution, until the distribution is ended. Rule lOb-7, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-7 (1987) prohibits market makers who underwrite the offering from entering into
transactions in the secondary market for the security which stabilize that market's price for the
security, except as provided by the rule.
94. See Bartos, U.S. Market Regulation and Global Offerings with a U.S. Tranche, 6 INT'L FIN.
L. REV., (July, 1987), at 16.
95. Rhone-Poulenc S.A., SEC No-Action Letter, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
78,444, at 77,455 (Mar. 13, 1987); see also, Banco de Santander S.A., SEC No-Action Letter,
[1987 Tranfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,523, at 77,684 (July, 28, 1987); C.H. Beazer
(Holdings) PLC, SEC No-Action Letter [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,664, at
77,855 (May 27, 1987); and British Petroleum Company Ltd., SEC No-Action Letters (June 14,
1987) (Oct. 31, 1979), (July 2, 1981), and (Sept. 15, 1983) (available in SEC files); Louis Vuitton,
S.A., SEC No-Action Letter (June 21, 1984) (available in SEC files); Compania Telefonica Nacional
de Espana, S.A., SEC No-Action Letter (June 11, 1987) (available in SEC files); Banco Central, S.A.
SEC No-Action Letter (June 30, 1987) (available in SEC files).
96. See Banco de Santander, supra note 95. See also Tokio Marine and Fire Insurance Co., SEC
No-Action Letter, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,519; Phillips N.V., SEC No-
Action Letter, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 78,449; Barclays PLC, 38 SEC Dkt. 661
(May 19, 1987).
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termed "passive market making," during a distribution of securities to areas
including the United States.97 ISE member market makers are required by ISE
rules to maintain a "continuous and competitive two-way price," regardless of
the pendency of any securities distribution. Moreover, ISE market makers that
cease to perform that function are barred from resuming it for three calendar
months. Recognizing the dissonance between Commission and ISE rules, the
Commission exempted ISE members that trade in so-called Alpha and Beta
securities98 from the Rule lOb-6 and lOb-7 prohibitions on certain conditions. The
conditions are that the price must be set by transactions which do not include a
statutory underwriter, that the market maker may not create or, for a limited
period of time, solicit active trading in the security, and that the firm will notify
both U.S. and U.K regulators of its intent to engage in possible market making
and make its records available to those authorities on request. The most recent
and ambitious of offerings along these lines involved the shares of British Pe-
troleum in October 1987. 99
The Commission staff has also provided guidance to registered U.S. and
foreign broker-dealers regarding U.S. regulatory requirements for unregistered
affiliates. Ordinarily, a registrant would be required by the Commission's re-
cordkeeping and net capital rules,' °0 to maintain reserves against all receivables
from its foreign unregistered affiliates. However, if the affiliate's books and
records are available for inspection by the Commission or by a self-regulatory
organization registered with the Commission, the reserve requirement will be
waived. Similarly, the Commission exempted a registered broker-dealer's unre-
gistered foreign affiliates from registration, despite the fact that they routed
orders in securities in which their registered affiliate made markets. This action
included provisos that, among other things, the U.S. broker-dealer would obtain
any information requested by the Commission regarding the trading activities of
its foreign affiliates.101 Finally, the Commission staff has permitted contacts
between a U.K. broker-dealer, its registered U.S. broker-dealer affiliate, and
97. International Stock Exchange of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland Limited,
SEC No-Action Letter (September 29, 1987) (available in SEC files).
98. Securities with six or more market makers from issuers whose market capitalization exceed 50
million pounds and whose previous quarter's share turnover was at least 10 million pounds. Topic
Services, Inc., 1987 Global Trading Information 7; Bartos, London Stock Exchange-SEC Agreement
on Market Making, 7 INT'L FIN .L. REv. 32, 33 (Jan. 1988). See MARKET BREAK REPORT, supra
note 4, at I1-11, n.35; and SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at V-35, n.82.
99. British Petroleum Company p.l.c., SEC No-Action Letter, [1987 Transfer Binderl Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 78,660 (Oct. 13, 1987); see also British Petroleum Company, p.l.c., SEC No-Action
Letter, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) [ 78,661 (Nov. 5, 1987).
100. Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4 under the Securities Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17a-3 and 17a-4
(1987) (recordkeeping), and 15c3-1 under the Securities Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1987)
(net capital).
101.Vickers da Costa Securities, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Aug. 14, 1985) (available in SEC
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U.S. customers concerning research produced by the U.K. firm without registra-
tion of the U.K. firm.'
0 2
B. Regulation of Trading Markets
While there is some room for the Commission to act unilaterally in adjusting
its administration of the securities laws to broker-dealers in the international
context, that room virtually disappears with respect to actual international trad-
ing. Any act in the U.S. by a financial intermediary inviting U.S. participation in
foreign securities transactions triggers the registration requirements of the Ex-
change Act. The Commission's compromise of these provisions has required
significant assurances of reliability, consistency, and uniformity from its foreign
regulatory counterparts. The thoroughness of U.S. regulation of this aspect of the
securities market, as with the issuer disclosure requirements, is a direct response
to the relatively high proportion of individual investors in the U.S. market. 03 The
very comprehensiveness of U.S. regulation of securities markets has been, how-
ever, in some respects, a catalyst for detailed international cooperation. Because
the Commission's discretion in making unilateral adjustments to the administra-
tion of U.S. regulations in response to international trade is limited, securities
regulators have made significant progress in coordinating and even standardizing
international regulation.
The approval of trading linkages between U.S. and foreign securities ex-
changes requires an active effort toward uniformity in regulatory and business
practices. 104 The Commission has approved linkages between Canadian and U.S.
exchanges'05 on the condition that the Canadian exchanges conform their audit
trails to U.S. practices and that they assure the Commission access to their
records, and those of their governing bodies, in spite of the Canadian "blocking"
102. Chase Manhattan Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, 11987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. 1 78,518 (July 28, 1987).
103. While individual investors have traditionally been few in number in most industrialized
countries (see supra note 5) individual securities investment is and has always been comparatively
common in the United States, see P. STONHAM, GLOBAL STOCK MARKET REFORMS 52-55, 117
(1987). This phenomenon of extensive individual investment explains why comprehensive regulations
backed by the antifraud provisions are the hallmark of U.S. securities regulation. Loomis and Grant,
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Financial Institutions Outside the U.S. and Extrater-
ritorial Application of the U.S. Securities Law, I J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 3, 21-23 (1978).
104. European linkages have encountered similar logistical difficulties. See discussion of German
links with Dutch, Swiss, French and Austrian markets in Kubler, Regulation Problems in Interna-
tionalizing Trading Markets, 9 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 107, 114 (1986).
105. Boston Stock Exchange-Montreal Stock Exchange link, approved, 49 Fed. Reg. 49,575
(1984); 50 Fed. Reg. 14,480 (1985); American Stock Exchange-Toronto Stock Exchange link, ap-
proved, 50 Fed. Reg. 39,201 (1985); Midwest Stock Exchange-Toronto Stock Exchange link, ap-
proved, 51 Fed. Reg. 11,854 (1985).
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statute. "06 The Commission recently entered into a Memorandum of Understand-
ing relating to the enforcement of the U.S. and Canadian securities laws with
securities regulators in Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia. 07
Similarly, a trading link between the International Futures Exchange (Ber-
muda) Ltd. ("Intex") and the Pacific Stock Exchange is conditioned on Intex's
agreement to provide information to the Pacific Stock Exchange for surveillance
and regulatory purposes, and the assurance of Bermuda's Minister of Finance that
Bermuda's blocking and secrecy statute, the Protection of Trading Interest Act of
1981, would not frustrate the sharing of information for surveillance and
regulation. 08
Even the approval of international quotation mechanisms requires bilateral
assurances of assistance in enforcement, in order to guard against market manip-
ulation. The Commission has approved an international quotation mechanism
between the ISE and the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD")
for the dissemination of current stock quotations-upon which trades may be
executed by other channels-without requiring the executing firm to register in
the United States as a broker-dealer, as the law would otherwise compel. °9 The
Commission approved this arrangement in the context of the recent reorganiza-
tion of securities regulation in the U.K., under the Financial Services Act 1986,
Ch. 6n0 and of the execution of a Memorandum of Understanding between the
106. A blocking statute prohibits citizens of the enacting state from producing evidence to a foreign
tribunal or authority without prior permission of the government. The Commission has received the
assurance of the Ontario Securities Commission that it is "extremely unlikely" that Canada's Foreign
Extraterritorial Treasures Act, Can. Stat. C. 49 (1985) would "prohibit the exchange of information
between the [Ontario Securities Commission] and SEC." Letter from the Ontario Securities Commis-
sion to the SEC (Sept. 24, 1985).
107. Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion and the Ontario Securities Commission, Commission des Valeurs Mobilieres du Quebec, and
British Columbia Securities Commission (Jan. 7, 1988), SEC News Digest (Jan. 6, 1988). For a
discussion of this agreement, see infra note 180 and accompanying text.
108. 51 Fed. Reg. 41,884 (1986). Letter from Mansfield H. Brock, Jr., Financial Secretary for
Bermuda Ministry of Finance, to Pacific Stock Exchange, Oct. 20, 1986.
The Commission has also agreed not to object, for a trial period of 18 months, to the offer of a
future based upon the price-weighted index of 225 stocks traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The
Chicago Mercantile Exchange offers this index, the Nikki Stock Average, to U.S. investors through a
linkage with the Singapore International Monetary Exchange, Inc. ("SIMEX") which is ordinarily
subject to CFTC supervision. Singapore International Monetary Exchange, Inc., CFTC Interpretive
Letter No. 86-6 (Dec. 5, 1986). For a discussion of the mechanics of this linkage, which are far more
extensive than the straightforward equity linkages approved by the SEC, see Comment, Extrater-
ritorial Application of United States Commodity and Securities Laws to Market Transactions in an
Age of Intercontinental Trading Links, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 351-379 (1985).
109. International Stock Exchange-National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 24,979, 52 Fed. Reg. 37,684 (Oct. 15, 1987).
110. For general discussions of the Act, see Brayno, The U.K. Financial Services Act 1986, 20
Sec. & Comp. Reg. 51 (Mar. 25, 1987); and Abrams, The U.K. Financial Services Act 1986, 3 Fin.
Serv. Reg. 101 (June 3, 1987).
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Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, in the United
States, and the Department of Trade and Industry in the United Kingdom on
September 23, 1986."' That Memorandum provides the Commission with access
to surveillance and regulatory information in the United Kingdom, and the U.K.
Department of Trade and Industry with access to similar information in the
U. S.112
On March 14, 1988, the Commission approved a second quotation linkage
between the NASD's NASDAQ quotation system and the Singapore Stock Ex-
change.113 That linkage provides for NASDAQ to provide closing quotations, last
sale, and volume information at the close of the trading day for 35 NASDAQ-
listed securities. 114
International clearance and settlement"' demands even closer cooperation. In
an arrangement for the mutual trading of a European market index, known as the
XMI, between the American Stock Exchange and the European Options Ex-
change, the European Options Exchange made arrangements to clear trades
through the Options Clearing Corporation, a clearing agent registered under the
federal securities laws. 6 In addition, the European Options Exchange adopted a
rule requiring a waiver of Dutch secrecy laws which otherwise provide a privilege
against production of customer information for surveillance purposes.
The approval of clearing linkages requires the most extensive effort towards
111. Memorandum of Understanding on Exchange of Information Between the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission and the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry in
Matters Relating to Securities and Between the United States Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion and the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry in Matters Relating to Futures (Sept.
23, 1986), 25 I.L.M. 1431 (1986). The U.K. Financial Services Act took effect April 29, 1988.
Pursuant to its provisions, the U.K. Department of Trade and Industry approved the NASD as an
exchange under British law, because its NASDAQ automated quotation system provides the medium
to share quotations in some 700 securities. The ISE and NASD plan to expand the linkage to include
clearance and settlement functions. Battle of the U.S. exchanges moves to London, Fin. Times, Apr.
20, 1988, at 11, col. 3; NASDAQ Receives Approval to Continue U.K. Trading, Wall St. J., Apr. 20,
1988, at 37, col. 6.
112. See Grundfest, Regulating the International Capital Markets, Speech given at Butcher Hall,
London, England (Nov. 11, 1987) (copy on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law).
Instinet Corporation ("Instinet"), a subsidiary of Reuters Holding PLC, is also operating an
automated quotation and execution system that functions internationally. See Instinet, SEC No-Action
Letter (August 8, 1986) (available in SEC files), stating that the Division would not recommend
enforcement action should Instinet operate the system without registration under Sections 3(a)(1), 5,
6, and 17A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
113. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 25,457, 53 Fed. Reg. 9,156 (Mar. 21, 1988).
114. 52 Fed. Reg. 42,167 (1987) (proposed Oct. 7, 1987).
115. For an explanation of clearance and settlement techniques in the United States, see D. WEIss,
AFTER THE TRADE IS MADE 311-29 (1986). See also SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at V-61 to
V-71 for a discussion of international clearance and settlement.
116. Appproved, 52 Fed. Reg. 16,469 (1987); 52 Fed. Reg. 19,942 (1987); 52 Fed. Reg. 32,368
(1987).
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uniformity of practice. "7 Typically, foreign clearing entities have either joined
U.S. clearing agencies or agreed to be bound by the U.S. agency's rules, includ-
ing financial standards and safeguards." 8 Where a foreign blocking statute might
prohibit the foreign clearing agency's full compliance with U.S. law or investiga-
tions, the Commission has obtained the agency's representation that it will pro-
vide any information requested by a participant in the transactions." 9 In addition,
the Commission staff has issued a no-action letter to allow a United States
registered clearing agency, the International Securities Clearing Corporation, to
clear and settle transactions on the International Stock Exchange for U.S. brokers
and dealers. 2 0
C. Recent Initiatives
In view of all this, the Commission issued a second "concept release" to
consider issues regarding the regulation of the securities markets themselves in
the international context, the Global rading Release.' 2' That release contained a
series of questions on how to proceed in adjusting U.S. regulation to the expan-
sion of international securities trading. Some foreign respondents stated that they
considered particular protections afforded under their local law and regulation
117. Uniformity of practice does not necessarily require the unity of all clearing organizations. As
one writer has observed, efficiency and uniformity can be attained by a number of different organiza-
tions operating under the same law; this would allow each organization to adjust to the particular
requirements of various financial products, or of various types of financial intermediaries. Weinberg,
Unsettled Question, Barron's, Feb. 15, 1988, at 16, col. 1. The author suggests that clearing agencies
should establish an "intermarket coordination and crisis-management group" to perfect coordinated
intermarket surveillance and to share financial, operational, and credit information.
118. Depository Trust Company-Bankers Trust Company agreement to hold for Nominee Amster-
dam Stock Exchange N.V., approved by letter of July 25, 1980; Trans Canada Options, Inc.-National
Securities Clearing Corporation agreement to settle options for Canadian exchanges, approved by
letter of Aug. 18, 1987; Canadian Depository for Securities-National Securities Clearing Corporation
agreement to clear and settle U.S. securities for Canadian members, SEC No-Action Letters (Oct. 24
and Nov. 26, 1984) (available in SEC files); Midwest Clearing Corporation & Midwest Securities
Trust Company-Vancouver Stock Exchange agreement to clear and settle U.S. and Canadian se-
curities, SEC No-Action Letter (Sep. 12, 1985), extended to the Stock Exchange, SEC No-Action
Letter (March 21, 1986), and to the ISE SEC No-Action Letter (June 25, 1986) (available in SEC
files); OEO-Options Clearing Corporation to clear and settle XMI options on a fully fungible basis,
52 Fed. Reg. 16,469 (1987).
119. Midwest Securities Trust Company and Midwest Clearing Corporation-Societe Interprofes-
sionelle pour [a Compensation des Valeurs Mobiliers ("SICOVAM"), SEC No-Action Letter (July
22, 1987) (available in SEC files). French law prohibits French citizens and companies from disclos-
ing evidence "with a view to foreign judicial or administrative proceedings or in connection there-
with." French Penal Code Law No. 80-538, art. I bis, (July 16, 1980). This blocking statute contrasts
with a secrecy law, such as the bank secrecy provisions of Swiss law, which operates like a legal
privilege. See infra notes 169 and 170 and accompanying text.
120. Appplication to register, 51 Fed. Reg. 29,184 (Aug. 6, 1986). SEC No-Action Letters (Sept.
10 and Dec. 10, 1986, and Oct. 29, 1987) (available in SEC files).
121. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 21,958, 50 Fed. Reg. 16,302 (Apr. 18, 1985).
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essential. 122 Thus, although they were attracted by multilateral arrangements,
many respondents cautioned that they believed bilateral arrangements were more
likely to preserve these essential local differences. 123 Nonetheless, commentators
on the proposal and participants in the SEC's Internationalization Roundtable,
held on February 17-18, 1987, agreed that multilateral agreements and uniform
standards must be developed some day to establish uniform international stan-
dards for the quotation of current transaction and quotation information, and for
clearance and settlement.
2 4
The U.S. is not alone in seeking to expand market linkages. Indeed, ambitious
steps toward the development of international markets and regulation are taking
place abroad. The European Economic Community is proposing an electronic
quotation link between markets in member countries, including London, Amster-
dam, and Paris. ' 25 Germany has explored linkages with four other European
states. 126 The Netherlands has also opened up a trading link in 24 Japanese stocks
with the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 127 The ISE has agreed to develop a price index
on the Tokyo and London prices of Japanese shares traded in London.
12
SICOVAM, the French securities clearing system, 129 is linked to markets in
Amsterdam, Belgium, and Tokyo. 130 Moreover, numerous direct trading links
have been forged between commodities exchanges.''
As part of its plan to form a single common market in goods and services by
1992, the European Economic Community has focused significant efforts on the
securities markets. Thus, the disclosure guidelines discussed above 3 2 are only
part of a broad-scale analysis of European regulation designed to "open ...
122. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at VA-10, VA-16, VA-17, VA-23, VA-25 (Toronto, Tokyo,
and Amsterdam Stock Exchanges).
123. Id. at VA-15 (Merrill Lynch support for intermarket linkages); VA-26 (U.S. and Australian
respondents' support for bilateral and multilateral law enforcement accords); VA-18 to VA-19 (com-
ments from U.S., Amsterdam, and Toronto that clearance links must be established on a reciprocal
basis); VB-9 (American Stock Exchange President's observation that common backgrounds help
surveillance sharing); VB-77 (Toronto Stock Exchange executive's observation that bilateral, "book-
based" linkage is the most efficient for global trading).
124. See generally, SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at VA-I to VB-36. The current international
securities market is primarily institutional and conducted over the counter. See id. and Kubler, supra
note 104, at 107. In such a market, current transaction and quotation information may be difficult to
obtain.
125. Quinn, Europeans Tie the Knot, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Dec. 1987, at 85.
126. See Kubler, supra note 104 at 114.
127. Shapiro, Amsterdam Takes on the Triad, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Dec. 1987, at 211, 212.
128. Wall St. J., Apr. 14, 1988, at 42.
129. See supra note 119.
130. D. AYLING, supra note 6, at 88.
131. See generally, Cox and Michael, The Market for Markets: Development of International
Securities and Commodities Trading, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 833 (1987). The authors note that,
ironically, intermarket links have generally preceded market demand. Id. at 835.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 82-87.
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frontiers to [financial] services from other parts of the community.' 13  While the
general approach has been to "harmonize" the domestic laws,'34 the EEC will be
faced with resolving some very important questions which could make its experi-
ences a model, or a lesson, for other efforts in international securities regulation.
The U.K. has already insisted that domestic securities authorities retain control
over the various European markets-at least "until other EC markets ... intro-
duce equivalent regulation" to its own. 31
Among the most ambitious of these plans is the EEC's recently proposed
electronic intermarket link for price reporting, trading and settlement, the Inter-
bourse Data Information System (IDIS). 36 It is to begin in the fall of 1988 with
current quotations over high-speed telecommunications lines between the ex-
changes in London, Amsterdam, Copenhagen and Paris. Ultimately, it is planned
to include the exchanges in Lisbon, Athens, Frankfurt, Milan, Dublin, Luxem-
bourg, Madrid and Brussels. This endeavor will necessarily entail standardizing
many trading practices. Even the first stage will involve coordinating London's
electronic Stock Exchange Automatic Quotation (SEAQ) quotation and execu-
tion system, SAEF automatic execution system,3 7 and electronic settlement sys-
tems Sequal, 3 8 and Talisman, 39 with the only partially automated systems on the
other exchanges. Moreover, quotations of last-done prices, which were the norm
in Amsterdam and Paris in 1985,40 will not be comparable to SEAQ's display of
two-way market maker quotes, best bid and ask data, volume, and last trade
information.14" The ultimate achievement of intermarket quotation, trading, and
settlement will depend on the development of one consistent standard in all of
those twelve markets.
Another type of problem the EEC faces is reconciling "national discrepancies
and barriers," ranging from domestic differences in bank lending and tax sys-
tems to different degrees of investor protection. 142 Thus, at the same time that the
U.K. will implement its Financial Services Act, requiring significant investor
protections, the EEC will implement moves to open up domestic markets with
minimal investor protections. U.K. law now requires financial intermediaries to
register in the U.K., directs brokers to give customers their "best advice," and
allows customers to obtain compensation for losses through self-regulatory or-
133. de Jonquieres, 1992: Countdown to Reality, Fin. Times, Feb. 19, 1988, at 18.
134. Merloe, supra note 82.
135. de Jonquieres, The City of London wakes up to the realities of /992, Fin. Times, Mar. I, 1988,
at 2.
136. Quinn, supra note 125, at 185.
137. Wolman, U.K. automated dealing, Fin. Times, Jan. 28, 1988, at 19.
138. This system provides execution and confirmation for trades in non-British equities, Wall St.
J., Jan. 19, 1988, at 52.
139. See P. STONHAM, supra note 103, at 109-113.
140. Comment, Internationalization of Stock Markets, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 532, 558 (1986).
141. Topic Services, Inc., 1987 Global Trading Information 2.
142. de Jonquieres, supra note 133.
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ganizations, compensation funds, or legal process in the courts. 143 Foreign firms
in London have complained of the costs of compliance with the U.K.'s new
rules. 144However, it is unclear whether some of the reorganizations and comput-
erizations at issue would have been necessary in any case to meet increased
competition as much as increased regulation. 1
45
In defense of the U.K. 's legislation, commentators point to the quadrupling of
small shareholders in the U.K. since 1979 and the "breakdown of the ethos of a
small 'self-regulating' club" as factors which compel increased regulation and
consumer protection. 146 These same factors, in fact, will be inherent in any true
"Europeanization" of the securities markets, and could produce legislation in the
EEC or the other EEC member states equivalent to the U.K. 's Financial Services
Act. 147 Indeed, it is possible that insufficient regulation, and consequent in-
creases in risk, could be a competitive disadvantage.1
48
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF U.S. SECURITIES REGULATION: BILATERAL
AGREEMENTS
Commensurate with the broad jurisdiction afforded it under the federal se-
curities laws, the Commission has occasionally attempted to act unilaterally in
enforcing its securities laws in the international context. Despite some success in
this approach, however, the Commission has focused most of its efforts in the
recent past on developing bilateral international agreements to coordinate se-
curities law enforcement.
A. The Unilateral Extension of U.S. Jurisdiction
United States courts have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a suit under
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws which alleges facts occur-
ring outside the United States, if the allegations meet one of two tests: (1) conduct
in this country, or (2) significant effects in the United States.'49
143. Wolman, A rush to keep to the rules, Fin. Times, Feb. 27, 1988, at IV.
144. See Blackwell, Financial Services Act worries commodity trade, Fin. Times, Feb. 26, 1988,
at 32.
145. Norman, Britain Appoints New Chief Regulator for Increasingly Upset Securities Firms, Wall
St. J., Feb. 29, 1988, at 36. Indeed, the SAEF automated execution system is expected to cut the costs
of execution by half. Wolman, supra note 137.
146. Wolman, supra note 143.
147. As one European investment banker put it, "the ultimate success of globalization will depend
on the political will of all the governments to adjust their policies and to coordinate their economic
and monetary policies in a way that will allow us to talk about one capital market." Euromarket: No
Pain; No Gain, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Feb. 1988, at 186.
148. See Perry, The Markets Need Stricter Regulation, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1988, at F2.
149. These tests, which are not contained in the federal securities laws, are set forth in the
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which provides, in Section 17,
for subject matter jurisdiction arising from conduct in the state, and, in Section 18, for subject matter
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Under the case law for the conduct test, the U.S. conduct must be more than
"merely preparatory." 50 However, the courts will not "allow the United States to
be used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even
when these are peddled only to foreigners."" I
The effects test requires an effect injurious to the American securities mar-
ket.1 52 Where the effects are merely "generalized," they will not support U.S.
subject matter jurisdiction."'
Given the expansive reach of U.S. jurisdiction and the increasing interna-
tionalization of securities markets, the Commission now more frequently finds
itself investigating possible violations of the U.S. securities laws in situations in
which a witness or evidence is located abroad. In those cases the Commission is
not infrequently confronted with foreign blocking and secrecy laws. 154 Blocking
statutes prohibit even voluntary disclosure to foreign states of certain types of
jurisdiction arising from effects in a state. Leasco Data Processing v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326,
1333-39 (2d Cir. 1972); see also Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F2d 27, 30 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
150. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, 519 F2d 974, 987 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018
(1975).
151. lIT v. Vencap, 519 F2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975). In this regard, the recent opinion of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., supra
note 149, misconstrues the case law. The court suggests in Zoelsch that there are two competing
"standards" for subject matter jurisdiction arising from conduct in the United States, one a "re-
strictive" standard deriving from Bersch supra, note 150 and the other a "permissive" one it finds in a
series of cases which it characterizes as allowing subject matter jurisdiction merely because some
conduct in furtherance of the scheme occurred in the United States. Id., at 30-31.
The dichotomy between these cases is nonexistent. As the court pointed out in its decision in SEC
v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977), cited as an exemplar of the "permissive" approach, its
determination was that the "defendants' conduct occurring within the borders of this nation was
essential to the plan to defraud," id. at 115 (emphasis added). In another "permissive" case cited by
Judge Bork, Continental Grain, Etc. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 E2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979) the
decision noted that the fraud "was devised and completed in the United States." Id. at 420. Ob-
viously, the courts concluded that the conduct in these cases met a higher standard than the one
attributed to them by the majority in Zoelsch.
152. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook. 405 E2d 200, 208-209 rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). See also Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corpora-
tion, 49 F2d 133, 136 (9th Cir. 1977).
153. Bersch, 519 F.2d at 988.
With some limitation (e.g., it does not fully recognize the analysis of Schoenbaum), the theories
developed in these cases have been recognized in the RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 416 (Tent. Final Draft 1985).
154. See, e.g., SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock of, and Call Options for
the Common Stock of Santa Fe Corporation, 81 Civ. 6553 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (WCC) affd 817 F.2d
1018 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied 56 U.S.L.W. 3568 (Feb. 16, 1988); SEC v. Tome, 638 F Supp. 596
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff d, 833 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Lombardfin S.PA. and
Trasatlantic Financial Co., v SEC,, 56 U.S.L.W. 3790 (May 16, 1988); SEC v. Levine, 86 Civ. 3726
(S.D.N.Y.) (RO), insider trading suits in which defendants tried to hide evidence of their activities
behind foreign secrecy statutes.
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information, usually related to international trade, national security and eco-
nomic matters, and typically provide for civil and criminal penalties.'55 Secrecy
laws, on the other hand, establish rights or privileges which allow individuals to
require others to maintain the confidentiality of certain types of information,
e.g., financial records.
156
Where the United States has personal jurisdiction over a foreign party, or its
agent, the Commission has often been successful in the U.S. courts in compel-
ling compliance with its efforts to obtain evidence.157 In SEC v. Banca Della
Svizzera Italiana, et al.,155 the court ordered the nominal defendant, a Swiss
bank which had effected securities purchases that the Commission alleged were
made with inside information, to reveal the names of its customers, despite the
contrary prohibition of Swiss banking law. The court concluded that: "it would
be a travesty of justice to permit a foreign company to invade American markets,
violate American laws if they were indeed violated, withdraw profits and resist
accountability for itself and its principals by claiming their anonymity under
foreign law."'
159
In response to its increasing encounters with foreign secrecy and blocking
laws, the Commission's Division of Enforcement proposed in 1984 that the
Commission announce that it would deem any purchase or sale of securities on a
U.S. market to be a waiver of the protections otherwise afforded by foreign
secrecy laws. 16 Most comments on this "waiver by conduct" proposal were
negative, and the Commission did not act on it.
B. International Efforts to Coordinate Securities Law Enforcement
Obtaining official foreign assistance in the Commission's enforcement efforts,
on the other hand, requires patient efforts on both sides to reconcile differing
legal concepts. The United States and Switzerland were at loggerheads for a
decade in trying to share information regarding insider trading, and were only
able to reach the beginning of an effective accommodation after Switzerland
155. See, e.g., French Penal Code Law No. 80-538, supra note 119, which forbids any French
subject from using or complying with foreign judicial or administrative evidence-gathering regarding
"economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical" information, except as provided by treaty.
156. See, e.g., The Bahamas Banks and Trust Companies Regulation (Amendment) Act, 1980,
which provides for the secrecy of bank records.
157. See SEC v. Minas de Artemisa, S.A., 150 F2d 215, 217 (9th Cir. 1945) compelling production
of records of a Mexican company because administrative subpoena had been served upon its Ameri-
can president in the U.S.
158. 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
159. Id. at 119. See also United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (1lth Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983) (court required foreign bank to comply with grand jury subpoena in
drug investigation).
160. 49 Fed. Reg. 31,300 (1984).
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entered into a tortuous examination of its law in order to define insider trading as
a violation of Swiss law.161
An even more extreme exercise in reconciliation is demonstrated by the Com-
mission's experience with the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence in
Civil and Commercial Matters. The Hague Convention was designed to reduce
international frictions by regularizing information-gathering procedures. In fact,
while the Convention has its uses, it has become apparent over the years that the
states which entered into the agreement had very different expectations from it.
These differences arose from fundamental differences in national legal systems.
In particular, United States style discovery is generally unknown outside this
country. Thus, while the Commission was accorded numerous courtesies in other
states under the Convention, it was fully successful in obtaining evidence under
the Convention only in a country with a legal system similar to the United
States-the United Kingdom.
62
161. See Rapp, Recent Developments in United States Insider Trading Prohibition and Swiss
Secrecy Laws: Towards a Definitive Reconciliation? 5 INT'L TAX Bus. LAw. 1, 28-32 (1987).
The EEC has also adopted a directive requiring member states to prohibit insider trading by
December 31, 1990. Lightburn, Insider Trading in France, 8 INT'L FIN. L. REv. 23, 24 (Jan. 1988).
A bill clarifying U.K. law on insider trading has already been submitted to Parliament. Insider Curb
in British Bill, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1988, at 48. Similar legislation was enacted in Belgium and the
Netherlands. Dawkins and Dixon, EEC proposes action on insider dealing, Fin. Times, April 29,
1987, at 48.
Outside the EEC, several other countries have recently proposed laws banning or clarifying a ban
in insider trading. New Zealand has proposed such a law, N.Z. plans insider trading law, Fin. Times,
Mar. 24, 1988, at 20; and Norway's stock exchange has stepped up its enforcement of insider trading
prohibitions, Froli, Oslo in insider trading move, Fin. Times, Mar. 3, 1988, at 18. The Japanese
government is also preparing a legislative proposal which would expand the legal definition of insider
trading and introduce criminal penalties. See Tokyo unveils 'insider' proposals, Fin. Times, Feb. 18,
1988, at 21. Only one defendant has been forced to return profits from insider trading under the
current Japanese law. Schoenberger, Japan Will Beef Up Insider Trading Laws, L.A. Times, Feb. 24,
1988, at 1. Indeed, changing the law may not be so difficult as changing a reported Japanese
perception that insider trading to benefit a company - as opposed to an individual - is harmless.
Wagstyl, Insider trading law traverses Japanese culture and ethics, Fin. Times, Feb. 22, 1988, at 23.
162. In Commission enforcement actions involving requests for court-ordered disgorgement,
which would be paid to private parties, courts in the United Kingdom, Guernsey, France and Italy
have afforded the Commission standing to invoke the Convention to obtain evidence. In re Evidence
(Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975 (Guernsey) Order 1980, (Stat. Inst. 1980 No. 1956); In
re Testimony of Constandi Nasser, Trib. Admin. de Paris, 6 eme section - 2 eme chambre, No.
51546/6 (Dec. 17, 1985). The Commission's use of the Convention has had mixed results: in the
United Kingdom, in particular, the Commission has been able to effectively use the Convention to
obtain evidence. In re Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdiction) Act 1975 (Q.B. Feb. 23, 1984)
(Drake, J.), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 511 (1984). But since the Convention does not obligate foreign
states to provide any greater discovery than available under their own mechanisms, the Commission
has also been entirely denied requests for documents, and partially denied access to testimony, on
various grounds. Statement on the Examination of Witnesses as Requested by a Foreign Letter
Rogatory (Pret. Milano, Italy Oct. 2, 1985).
Partially in light of these limitations, the Supreme Court recently decided, in Societe International
Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. S. D. Iowa, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987), that, as a matter of
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After this experience, the Commission turned to bilateral agreements with
foreign authorities for the sharing of enforcement and surveillance information.
While bilateral arrangements have limitations, they are more specialized than
multilateral approaches. Among the limitations are the fact that most govern-
ments (the United States included) wi!l not use their compulsory power to investi-
gate an act which is not a violation of their own law,163 and that foreign
governments are sometimes reluctant to cooperate with the SEC for fear that the
Commission would ultimately allow access to their enforcement information by
private U.S. plaintiffs.' 64 These limitations are outweighed by the fact that a
bilateral agreement can squarely address substantive and procedural differences
between the signatories.
1. Mutual Assistance Treaties
The United States has entered into four criminal treaties, 65 and completed
negotiations on four more,'66 for the exchange of information regarding poten-
U.S. law, the use of the Convention is not mandatory for discovery against foreign litigants of
evidence located abroad.
163. One exception is the Quebec Securities Commission, which is empowered under the Se-
curities Act, Que. Rev. Stat. Ch. V-I (1977), to order an investigation regarding violations of the laws
enforced by another legislative authority. Charter and Beck, Problems of Enforcement in the Multina-
tional Securities Market, 9 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 467, 473 (1987).
On May 5, 1988, the SEC approved a staff proposal to submit draft legislation to Congress which
would enable the Commission to use its compulsory investigative powers to assist foreign securities
regulators regardless of whether a likelihood exists that U.S. law has been violated.
164. This problem turns on the prevalence of private securities suits in the United States. While the
United States, like Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada, provides for private enforcement of
its securities laws, the United States is alone in allowing them to be brought as class-action suits.
Thus, private securities cases are more common in the United States than in other common law
countries.
Moreover, such suits are generally unheard of in civil law countries, and, indeed, the existence of
private securities remedies in the United States is alarming to some foreign commentators. See
generally, Note, Barriers to the International Flow of Capital: The Facilitation of Multinational
Securities Offerings, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 81, 107-09 (1987). Japan, a civil law state, allows
for private actions; however societal factors have made such actions almost unknown. See Pillai,
Securities Regulation in Malaysia: Emerging Norms of Governmental Regulation, 8. J. COMP. Bus.
AND CAP. MKT. L. 39, 47 (1986). France also allows for civil actions, but only a few have been
recently initiated. Lightburn, supra note 161, at 25.
165. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-Switzerland
27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 (entered into force Jan. 23, 1977); Treaty on Extradition and
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 7, 1979, United States-Turkey, 32 U.S.T. 3111, T.I.A.S.
9891 (entered into force Jan. I, 1981); Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance, June 12, 1981, United
States-Netherlands, T.I.A.S. 10734 (entered into force Sept. 15, 1983); Treaty on Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters, Nov. 9, 1982, United States-Italy, 24 I.L.M. 1539 (1985) (entered into force
Nov. 13, 1985).
166. Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 18, 1985, Unites States-Canada,
(pending Canadian ratification); Treaty Concerning the Cayman Islands and Mutual Legal Assistance
in Criminal Matters, July 3, 1986, United States-United Kingdom, 26 I.L.M. 536 (1987) (pending
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tially criminal conduct, which are broad enough to include securities law vio-
lations. General-purpose agreements like the mutual criminal assistance treaties,
however, may have some drawbacks when used for securities law enforcement. 167
The Commission's efforts to use the Swiss treaty to obtain information about
insider trading illustrate how differences between legal systems can hamper
sharing information relevant to securities regulation under a conventional mutual
assistance treaty.
The Swiss mutual assistance treaty covers various forms of fraud, but the
Swiss courts construed it not to be expressly available to the Commission for
limited evidence gathering concerning insider trading. 68 This is because the
Swiss treaty, like many others, provides for "dual criminality"-the requirement
that it be used only for a matter under investigation in the United States which
would, if proven to violate U.S. law, also violate Swiss law-and insider trading
as understood in the U.S. was until recently not fully subject to criminal sanc-
tions under Swiss law. Bank secrecy, on the other hand, has long been highly
valued under Swiss law. '69 This put the SEC in the position of making some of its
requests under the treaty for banking information on insider trading in opposition
to a significant protected domestic interest. 7 °
U.K. and Cayman ratification); Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance, Aug. 20, 1980, United States-
Columbia, (pending Colombian ratification); and Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance, Oct. 10,
1983, United States-Morocco (pending Moroccan ratification).
167. Mutual assistance treaties are available to all federal governmental inquiries. Recently, for
example, the Special Prosecutor investigating the sales of arms to Iran was successful in overcoming
Swiss court challenges by Albert Hakim to the use of the Swiss mutual assistance treaty to obtain
access to his Swiss bank records, and those shared with General Richard Secord. In a related case, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that a U.S. prosecutor may serve a
subpoena on a U.S. entity which controls evidence in Switzerland without first resort to the treaty. In
re Sealed Case, No. 87-5256, slip op. at 28-32 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 6, 1987).
168. Swiss courts have construed the fraud language in the treaty not to reach insider trading by
persons who had obtained inside information by legitimate means, i.e., as corporate directors. See
infra note 175. This is contrary both to Congressional expectation, (see Exec. Doc. F, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. Feb. 18, 1976) and to the understanding of the Swiss government at the time the treaty was
signed and ratified. Id.
169. Rapp, supra note 161, at 7-10; Comment, The Conflict Between United States Securities Laws
on Insider Trading and Swiss Bank Secrecy Laws, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 318, 332-35 (1985);
Honegger, Demystification of the Swiss Banking Secrecy and Illumination of the United States-Swiss
Memorandum of Understanding, 9 N.C. J. INT'L COM. REG. I, 1-9 (1983). Ironically, both signatory
governments believed that the inclusion of language in the criminal assistance treaty relating to fraud
and false business practices overcame this impasse. See Exec. Doc. F, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. Feb. 18,
1976.
170. As one Swiss commentator opined, "even if the Treaty is applicable Ito SEC requests], the
Swiss banking secrecy can be superseded only if the prosecuted act is a crime in Switzerland as well.
But insider trading, i.e., securities transactions executed while in possession of material nonpublic
information, is not prohibited explicitly under Swiss law." Honegger, supra note 169, at 18(footnotes
omitted).
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2. Memoranda of Understanding
The Commission has therefore entered into more specialized agreements with
foreign securities counterparts which are specifically tailored to securities law
investigations. These memoranda of understanding ("MOUs") have been signed
with the government of Switzerland, 7 ' the United Kingdom's Department of
Trade and Industry,'72 the Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia Securities Com-
missions, 73 and the Japanese Ministry of Industry and Trade (MITI).'
7 4
The MOU between the Commission and Switzerland, supplemented by an
exchange of letters, was expressly designed to improve the exchange of informa-
tion about insider trading between Switzerland and the Securities Exchange
Commission. The principal component of these letters was the recognition that
certain Swiss criminal statutes paralleled the antifraud provisions of the securities
laws, and that the Commission's function in investigations and litigation is in the
nature of criminal enforcement. "' The agreement provided for its execution by
the membership of a private group of Swiss bankers, which required their cus-
tomers to waive Swiss bank secrecy as a condition of conducting securities
transactions in the U.S.
171. Memorandum of Understanding to Establish Mutually Acceptable Means for Improving
International Law Enforcement Cooperation in the Field of Insider Trading, Aug. 31, 1982, United
States-Switzerland, 22 I.L.M. 1 (1983).
172. See supra note Ill. The Commodities Futures Trading Commission is also a party to the U.K.
MOU.
173. See supra, note 107.
174. Memorandum of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the Securities Bureau of
the Japanese Ministry of Finance on the Sharing of Information, May 23, United States-Japan, 25
I.L.M. 1429 (1986). The Japanese MOU merely agrees to cooperation between the regulators.
However, the Securities Bureau of MITI and the Commission have since agreed to encourage self-
regulatory organizations in the two countries to develop procedures "for the exchange of financial,
surveillance and investigatory information .. " Securities Bureau-SEC Press Release (Feb. 17,
1988) (copy on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law).
175. At roughly the same time that the MOU was signed, the Commission obtained two important
decisions recognizing some uses of the mutual assistance treaty for insider trading investigations in
the Swiss courts. Judgment of Jan. 26, 1983, Tribunal federal 109 Arrets du Tribunal federal suisse,
Recueil official Ib 47 (1983) (Santa Fe 1), summarized at 22 I.L.M. 785 (1983); Judgment of May 16,
1984, Tribunal federal (Santa Fe 11), reproduced in 28 ETUDES SUISSES DE DROIT EUROPEEN 316
(1984). During these proceedings, the Swiss government informed the court that it believed the U.S.
concept of insider trading to be wholly within the scope of the treaty.
The two opinions were issued in response to oppositions to SEC access filed in Switzerland by
Swiss account holders, in a case bought by the Commission in the federal district court for the
Southern District of New York, SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers. See supra note 154. The
opponents argued that the Commission failed to demonstrate the requisite dual criminality to use the
Treaty. The thrust of these two decisions is that the Commission may obtain access under the Treaty
when it can demonstrate that it seeks information regarding the actions of tippees, who would not
legitimately have come into possession of insider information. For a complete discussion of these two
decisions, and the implications under Swiss law, see Rapp, supra note 161, at 21-24.
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After considerable debate, the Swiss parliament has now adopted a law prohib-
iting insider trading. The drafters of this legislation had to develop concepts of
insiders, materiality, prohibited benefits, scope of regulation, and even defini-
tions of securities in order to fit the idea of insider trading into the framework of
Swiss law. 7 6 The United States and Switzerland then entered into a diplomatic
note agreeing that, since insider trading can now be termed criminal in both
states, the SEC could use the treaty to investigate Swiss bank accounts implicated
in insider trading cases, even for U.S. civil or administrative actions.'77
This decade-long excursus demonstrates how memoranda of understanding
may be tailored to the particular legal or procedural difficulty presented by an
SEC request in the receiving country, or by a foreign request in the United
States.' 78 Thus, the Swiss MOU relied upon an undertaking in a private agree-
ment among Swiss bankers to obtain waivers from their customers of Swiss
banking secrecy, and to submit any Commission request which applies defined
standards for suspect trading to a Swiss bank. In return for their waiver of Swiss
legal protection and inhibitions, the Swiss retained the final authority to reject the
request. Similarly, the MOU with the United Kingdom provides the SEC with the
investigative and enforcement assistance of British authorities, but limits the
types of requests which the Commission may make and the use to which it can
put information it receives through the MOU.
Moreover, the Commission's experience with MOUs illustrates their effective-
ness in securities enforcement. For instance, the Swiss MOU has enabled the
Commission to trace and seize assets which were heretofore untouchable.179
In contrast to the earlier MOUs, the MOU between the SEC and the securities
commissions of Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia is broader in scope in two
176. Rapp, supra note 161, at 26-33.
177. The U.S.-Switzerland Mutual Assistance Treaty enables the parties at their discretion to
extend the treaty mechanisms to administrative functions, such as those performed by the SEC. See
Goelzer, Riesenberg, and Sullivan, International Markets Hamper Enforcement, N.Y.L.J (Dec. 7,
1987); and Haymann, Swiss Outlaw Insider Trading, INT'L FIN. L. REV. 30 (Oct. 1987) for general
discussion of these matters. The notes establish that compulsory treaty mechanisms are available for
'offenses that involve the purchase or sale of securities by persons in possession of material non-
public information," language which is expressly designed to include Commission investigations and
civil suits.
178. For a more comprehensive listing of the merits of an MOU, see Pitt, Hardison and Shapiro,
Problems of Enforcement in the Multinational Securities Market, 9 U. PA. J. OF INT'L L. 375,
435-37 (1987).
179. Since the operation of the MOUs is not generally a matter of public record, few details of this
cooperation are available for discussion in this article. However, one case under the Swiss MOU is in
the public record, and is instructive. In SEC v. Harvey Katz, Marcel Katz, Elie Mordo, and Fred
Aizen, Civil Action No. 86 Civ. 6088 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), the Commission sought injunctive relief and
disgorgement against a group of people who it alleged had traded in the securities of RCA Corpora-
tion on inside information about its upcoming merger with General Electric. In its investigation of
this trading, the Commission was able to identify one defendant, Elie Mordo who traded through a
Swiss bank, and to obtain a freeze of his assets in the bank.
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respects: it is not limited by dual criminality, and it provides for the use of
compulsory measures even when no violative conduct occurred in the receiving
state. The MOU states that the signatories will provide the fullest mutual as-
sistance to facilitate securities market oversight and the conduct of investigations,
litigation or prosecution where information is sought to determine whether, or to
prove that the laws or regulations of the requesting state have been violated.
Thus, the MOU does not refer to the receiving state's law to limit the scope of
conduct concerning which information may be sought. 180 The Canadian MOU
requires only a general description of the matter subject to the request and the
legal provisions pertaining to that matter.
The signatories to the Canadian MOU specifically recognize that they may not
at present possess the legal authority to provide the legal assistance contemplated
by the terms of the MOU. Rather, they pledge to use all reasonable efforts to
obtain the necessary authorization to provide the assistance described. The MOU
states that "assistance" includes providing information already in the possession
of the requested state, as well as taking evidence and obtaining documents. One
example of a situation in which investigatory authority might currently be lacking
would be when the SEC is requested to provide information relevant to conduct
where, although the evidence exists in the U.S., the potential violation occurred
entirely outside the U.S. and had no effect on U.S. markets. Presumably, con-
gressional action is required to authorize the Commission to investigate such
conduct at the request of a foreign regulator.'8'
CONCLUSION
The future development of international markets hinges in large part on creat-
ing satisfactory international regulatory agreements in a number of areas. These
areas range from enforcement interest, to the regulation of broker-dealer and
market functions, where uniform international regulation is taking on increased
importance. In addition, although many of the Commission's initial steps have
been unilateral, certain registration and periodic disclosure requirements will
eventually have to be conformed to international standards. 8
180. The agreement defines the term "laws and regulation" as including, without limitation,
certain areas concerning securities regulation such as insider trading, misrepresentation, periodic
reporting, financial responsibility and customer protection. The MOU also provides that a state may
deny a request "on grounds of public interest."
181. Legislation has been introduced which would provide the Commission with such authority.
Section 202 of H.R. 2668 submitted to the 100th Congress provides that an investigation undertaken
at the request of a foreign government may be considered an investigation that is "necessary and
proper to the enforcement of the federal securities laws." See Goelzer, Riesenberg and Sullivan,
supra note 177. The Commission has also now approved a more comprehensive legislative proposal
of its own to the same end. See supra note 163.
182. Even developing securities markets with adequate domestic regulation can participate in the
development of international regulation. A Singapore legal writer observes that the principal purpose
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As securities trading evolves from transactions among business acquaintances
to transactions through anonymous electronic links, the pressures for consistent
international standards of business practice, as well as consistent legal ones for
protection and enforcement, will increase. The international response to that
pressure will be shaped, at least in part, by the interests which the participating
states seek to protect, whether they are the safety of small investors or of local
banks, or the integrity of domestic markets. This article has attempted to put
competing interests in context with current efforts of the SEC, and to suggest
some areas where future efforts at cooperation may be fruitful.
of securities regulation should be disclosure and investor protection. He continues that, in his
opinion, the government must take a more interventionist stand to achieve those ends than in countries
like the U.K and the U.S. in a country whose markets do not have institutional capacity. He defines
institutional capacity along Western models as private and governmental ability to screen and super-
vise issues and broker-dealers and, in the U.S., the availability of securities class action suits). Pillai,
supra note 164, at 47.
